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Plea bargaining is the dominant method by which our criminal justice system resolves cases.
More than ninety-five percent of state and federal convictions today are the product of guilty
pleas.  Yet the practice continues to draw widespread criticism.  Critics charge that it is too coer-
cive and leads innocent defendants to plead guilty, that it obscures the true facts in criminal
cases and produces overly lenient sentences, and that it enables disparate treatment of similarly
situated defendants.
Another feature of plea bargaining—its lack of transparency—has received less attention,
but is also concerning.  In contrast to the trials it replaces, plea bargaining occurs privately and
off the record.  Victims and the public are excluded, and the defendant is typically absent.  While
the Sixth and First Amendments rights of public access extend to a range of pretrial criminal
proceedings, they do not apply to plea negotiations.  For the most part, rules and statutes also fail
to require transparency in the process.  As a result, plea bargaining is largely shielded from
outside scrutiny, and critical plea-related data are missing.
There are some valid reasons for protecting aspects of plea negotiations from public scrutiny.
Confidentiality fosters candor in the discussions and may encourage prosecutors to use their
discretion more leniently.  It can help protect cooperating defendants from retaliation.  And it
may expedite cases and conserve resources.
Yet the secrecy of the process also raises concerns.  It prevents adequate oversight of coercive
plea bargains, untruthful guilty pleas, and unequal treatment of defendants.  It can hinder
defense attorneys from providing fully informed advice to their clients.  It can also potentially
impair victims’ rights and interests.  Finally, the absence of transparency leaves judges with few
guideposts by which to evaluate plea bargains and inhibits informed public debate about crimi-
nal justice reform.
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This Article reviews plea-bargaining laws and practices across the United States and argues
that we can do more to enhance the documentation and transparency of plea bargaining.  It then
proposes concrete areas in which transparency can be improved without significant costs to the
criminal justice system.
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INTRODUCTION
For several decades, plea bargaining has been the dominant method of
resolving cases in U.S. criminal courts.  Today, over ninety-five percent of
convictions at the state and federal levels are the product of guilty pleas.1  As
1 See MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 248470, FED-
ERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2012—STATISTICAL TABLES 17 tbl.4.2 (2015) (finding that ninety-
seven percent of federal convictions were disposed of via guilty plea).  For state statistics,
see State Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons 2004—Statistical Tables: Felony Case Processing in
State Courts, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/scscf04/
tables/scs04401tab.cfm (Dec. 16, 2020) (finding that ninety-five percent of state convic-
tions were obtained through a guilty plea); 2018 Criminal Caseloads—Trial Courts: 2018 Gen.
Jurisdiction Criminal Jury Trials and Rates, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS.: CT. STAT. PROJECT,
http://popup.ncsc.org/CSP/CSP_Intro.aspx [hereinafter CT. STAT. PROJECT] (choose
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the Supreme Court has acknowledged, “[Plea bargaining] is not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.”2
Yet despite its prevalence, plea bargaining remains controversial.  Critics
charge that it is too coercive and leads innocent defendants to plead guilty,
that it obscures the true facts in criminal cases and produces overly lenient
sentences, and that it enables disparate treatment of similarly situated
defendants.3
Another feature of plea bargaining—its lack of transparency—has
received less attention, but is also troubling.4  Unlike the trials it replaces,
plea bargaining occurs privately and off the record.5  Victims and the public
are excluded from the negotiations, and even the defendant is typically
absent.  Plea offers are often not documented, and the final plea agreements
are not always in writing or placed on record with the court.6  Plea hear-
ings—at which a judge reviews the validity of a defendant’s guilty plea—are
public, but they tend to be brisk, rote affairs that often fail to reveal all of the
concessions exchanged between the parties.7  As a result, plea bargaining is
largely shielded from outside scrutiny, and critical plea-related data are
missing.
The opacity of plea bargaining stands in marked contrast to the constitu-
tional commitment to public criminal proceedings, enshrined in the Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial and the First Amendment right of public
access to the courts.8  Courts have uniformly held that these rights extend to
“Criminal” tab from top bar, then select “Gen. Jurisdiction Criminal Jury Trials and Rates”
from the “Select Chart/Table” menu) (last visited Nov. 1, 2020) (showing that for most
states, jury trials amounted to only about one to two percent of criminal dispositions).
2 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
3 For a review of plea-bargaining critiques, see Jenia I. Turner, Plea Bargaining, in 3
REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 73, 80–88 (Erik Luna ed.,
2017).
4 See, e.g., STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 26–27 (2012); WIL-
LIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 302 (2011) (“Guilty pleas,
especially ones that happen early in the process, are largely invisible.  So is the bargaining
that lies behind them.”).  For a more in-depth discussion of the lack of transparency in the
criminal process generally or in plea bargaining more specifically, see generally Stephanos
Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911 (2006);
Michael P. Donnelly, Truth or Consequences: Making the Case for Transparency and Reform in the
Plea Negotiation Process, 17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 423 (2020); Andrea Kupfer Schneider &
Cynthia Alkon, Bargaining in the Dark: The Need for Transparency and Data in Plea Bargaining,
22 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 434 (2019); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in
Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409 (2003) (arguing that charge bargains, even more
than sentencing bargains, suffer from a lack of transparency).
5 See BIBAS, supra note 4, at 34–35; see also United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189,
191 (2d Cir. 2005) (plea hearing conducted in judge’s robing room).
6 See infra Part I.
7 See infra Part I.
8 See infra Part II.
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arraignments, plea hearings, and sentencing hearings.9  But plea negotia-
tions and plea offers have been shielded from such access, without sufficient
analysis of the justification for secrecy.
To be sure, there are valid reasons for protecting aspects of plea negotia-
tions from public scrutiny.  Confidentiality fosters candor in negotiations and
encourages prosecutors to use their discretion to provide leniency in appro-
priate cases.10  It also helps shield cooperating defendants from retaliation.11
Finally, the informality and lack of documentation of plea offers may help
conserve resources and expedite case processing.12
Yet the secrecy of the process also raises a number of concerns.  First, it
prevents adequate oversight of a procedure that has been broadly criticized
as enabling coercion, concealment of facts, and disparate treatment.  Non-
transparency makes it more difficult for defense attorneys to assess the rea-
sonableness of plea offers they receive and to provide fully informed advice
to their clients.  It can give rise to unnecessary disputes after the fact about
the terms of the bargain and the quality of assistance provided by defense
counsel.  The lack of transparency also frustrates the ability of victims to pro-
vide meaningful input, and it leaves judges with few guideposts by which to
evaluate the fairness of plea bargains and the validity of guilty pleas.  More
broadly, it limits the public’s understanding of plea bargaining and inhibits
informed public debate about criminal justice reform.
Given the significant costs of secrecy, it is time to revisit the issue.  This
Article reviews U.S. plea-bargaining laws and practices and argues that courts
and legislatures across the country can and should do more to enhance the
documentation and transparency of plea bargaining.  There are four areas in
which transparency can be improved without imposing significant costs.
First, states across the country can adopt rules requiring that plea agree-
ments be in writing and placed on record with the court.  Many states and
the federal system already do so, and the requirement has not proven bur-
densome.  Concerns about the safety of cooperators have been addressed by
sealing portions of the plea records that relate to cooperation.13  The record-
ing requirement helps reduce disputes about the terms of plea agreements,
9 See infra Part II; see also Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial
World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2174 (2014).
10 See infra Sections III.A–B.
11 See infra Section III.C.
12 See infra Section III.D.
13 Memorandum from J. Wm. Terrell Hodges, Chair, Comm. on Ct. Admin. & Case
Mgmt., and J. Roger W. Titus, Privacy Subcomm. Chair, Comm. on Ct. Admin. & Case
Mgmt., to C.JJ., U.S. Dist. Cts., Dist. JJ., U.S. Dist. Cts., Dist. Ct. Execs., and Clerks, U.S. Dist.
Cts. (June 30, 2016), in ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIM. RULES, COOPERATOR SUBCOMMITTEE
REPORT 243, 245, 250–51 (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-09-
criminal-agenda_book_0.pdf [hereinafter Interim Guidance for Cooperator Information]
(discussing sealing practices to address the problem of cooperator safety); Memorandum
from Michelle Morales, Acting Dir., Off. Pol’y & Legis., to Hon. Lewis A. Kaplan, Chair,
Rules Subcomm. on Cooperators (July 12, 2016), in ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIM. RULES,
supra, at 309, 310–12 (same).
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and it promotes fairness by ensuring that defendants understand the conse-
quences of pleading guilty.  By making plea agreements a matter of public
record, it also better aligns with our constitutional commitment to open
criminal proceedings.
Second, lawmakers can adopt rules requiring that plea offers be placed
on record with the court whenever a defendant rejects the offer and the case
is set for trial.  Some courts have already used this recording practice to
ensure that defense counsel has conveyed a plea offer to her client and to
reduce disputes about counsel’s assistance in the process.14  The practice has
proven workable and has been generally well received by the participants.
Because plea offers that are placed on file with the court become public
records, this rule also advances the constitutional commitment to open crimi-
nal proceedings.  It exposes plea bargaining to additional scrutiny and gives
the public a better understanding of the penalties imposed on defendants
who reject plea offers and exercise the right to trial.  Such knowledge can
help inform criminal justice debates and proposals for reform.
A third way to enhance transparency in plea bargaining is to require the
recording of plea offers, charging decisions, sentencing outcomes, and other
key facts about a criminal case in digital databases that are searchable and
available to prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges.  The adoption of
such databases would help promote fairness and equal treatment of defend-
ants by educating lawyers and judges about plea precedents and facilitating a
more informed analysis of plea offers.15  Widely available and cost-effective
case management software makes such digital documentation practical, and
the growing support for better data collection in the criminal process makes
it politically viable.16
Finally, states and the federal system should encourage more probing
judicial review of plea agreements and require that any plea discussions that
involve the court occur on the record.17  By strengthening judicial oversight
of plea bargains and exposing key aspects of the plea negotiations to the
public, these reforms would help improve oversight of coercive practices, dis-
parate treatment, and untruthful plea bargains.  While more active judicial
intervention is likely to consume some additional time, states that have intro-
duced this practice have found it workable.18  Placing judicial participation
on the record may add minor logistical burdens, but would reduce the risk of
judicial coercion and increase public confidence in the process.
In brief, there are various ways to improve transparency in plea bargain-
ing that would enhance the fairness and legitimacy of the process without
14 See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 146–47 (2012); see also Joel Mallord, Comment,
Putting Plea Bargaining on the Record, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 683, 685 (2014); Stephanie Stern,
Note, Regulating the New Gold Standard of Criminal Justice: Confronting the Lack of Record-Keep-
ing in the American Criminal Justice System, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 245, 250–51 (2015).
15 See infra Section V.D.
16 See infra Section V.D.
17 See infra Section V.E.
18 See infra Section V.E.
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imposing undue burdens on the criminal justice system.  In a time when
most criminal cases are resolved through plea bargains, we need to bring the
process out of the shadows and reaffirm our longstanding commitment to
open criminal proceedings.
I. LACK OF TRANSPARENCY IN PLEA BARGAINING
Although plea bargaining is the standard method by which criminal
cases are resolved today, its operation remains informal and obscure.  Any
negotiations between the parties remain off the record and closed to the
public.19  Neither the victim nor the defendant is typically present during the
negotiations,20 and the judge is usually not privy to them either.21  In most
jurisdictions, judges are expressly prohibited from participating in negotia-
tions out of concern that their involvement might be too coercive and might
prejudice them in the event the negotiations fall apart and the case proceeds
to trial.22
Typically, plea offers are not publicly announced or placed on the
record.  They are often not even reduced to writing, but are instead conveyed
informally—over the phone, in the courtroom corridor, or in the prosecu-
tor’s office.23  Even when written down, they are rarely entered into a
database that could be searched to compare results.24  Instead, any records of
plea offers typically remain in the prosecutor’s paper file (which is closed to
19 See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMEND-
MENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 16 (2018).
20 See Thea Johnson, Public Perceptions of Plea Bargaining, 46 AM. J. CRIM. L. 133, 139
(2019).
21 Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View,
54 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 199, 202–03 (2006).
22 Id. at 202–03, 202 n.6.
23 See Bibas, supra note 4, at 34–35; Ronald F. Wright, Jenny Roberts & Betina Cutaia
Wilkinson, The Shadow Bargainers, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 48
tbl.8) (finding in a multistate survey of public defenders that the most common channel of
communication for plea negotiations is “in person, in courthouse,” followed by email, then
telephone, then “in-person, in office”); Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’
of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/
stronger-hand-for-judges-after-rulings-on-plea-deals.html (“While many states require plea
agreements to be written and presented before a judge, plea offers are often verbal and
made in informal settings.”).  In only one state—New Jersey—rules expressly require that
plea offers be in writing. N.J. CT. R. 3:9-1 (“Any plea offer to be made by the prosecutor
shall be in writing and shall be included in the post-indictment discovery package.”).  In
California, caselaw recommends that offers be memorialized. In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747,
756 n.7 (Cal. 1992) (encouraging parties to “memorialize in some fashion prior to trial (1)
the fact that a plea bargain offer was made . . . (2) that the defendant was advised of the
offer [and] its precise terms, . . . and (3) the defendant’s response to the plea bargain
offer”).
24 See Kay L. Levine, Ronald F. Wright, Nancy J. King & Marc L. Miller, Sharkfests and
Databases: Crowdsourcing Plea Bargains, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 653, 664 (2019).  This practice
was also confirmed through informal interviews with practitioners in Texas, Georgia, Ohio,
and in federal court.
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outsiders), or in an email shared only with the defense attorney working on
the case.25  Recording remains haphazard and highly variable from prosecu-
tor to prosecutor and from office to office.26
If an offer is accepted, the resulting plea agreement is more likely to be
written down and filed with the court.  Yet even this custom is not uniform
across jurisdictions.  Only about half of the states require that the agreement
be disclosed on the record, and an even smaller group mandate that the
agreement be placed in writing.27  Both caselaw and anecdotal accounts con-
firm that oral plea agreements are not uncommon,28 even in jurisdictions
that require the agreement to be in writing.29  It is only when a plea agree-
25 See NICOLE ZAYAS FORTIER, ACLU SMART JUST., UNLOCKING THE BLACK BOX: HOW
THE PROSECUTORIAL TRANSPARENCY ACT WILL EMPOWER COMMUNITIES AND HELP END MASS
INCARCERATION 9 (2019); BESIKI KUTATELADZE, WHITNEY TYMAS & MARY CROWLEY, RACE AND
PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN 6, 9 n.10 (2014).
26 See, e.g., FORTIER, supra note 25, at 9.
27 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(2) (requiring disclosure of plea agreements “in open
court” or, on showing of good cause, in camera); ALA. R. CRIM. P. 14.3(b) (“[T]he court
shall require the disclosure of the [plea] agreement in open court . . . .”); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P.
17.4(b) (“The terms of a plea agreement must be in writing and be signed by the defen-
dant, defense counsel (if any), and the prosecutor.  The parties must file the agreement
with the court.”); IND. CODE § 35-35-3-3(a) (2017) (“No plea agreement may be made by
the prosecuting attorney to a court on a felony charge except: (1) in writing . . . .  The plea
agreement shall be shown as filed . . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-243(d) (West
2020) (“All proceedings pursuant to this Rule, including the defendant’s pleading, advice
by the court, and inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea or a plea agreement shall be on
the record.”); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(2) (“The parties shall disclose the plea agreement in
open court on the record . . . .”).
28 See, e.g., Williams v. State, 502 S.W.3d 168, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (finding oral
addendum to written plea agreement ambiguous); Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d
448, 457 (Ky. 2001) (“Oral plea agreements are not uncommon.”); State v. D’Amico, 2000
MT 63, ¶¶ 7–15, 997 P.2d 773, 775 (noting the existence of an oral plea agreement, which
was later modified by a written plea agreement); State v. Silvers, 620 N.W.2d 73, 77 (Neb.
2000) (“It appeared that the plea agreement was to be ‘informal’ in nature . . . .”); State v.
Farrell, 2000 ND 26, ¶¶ 12–16, 606 N.W.2d 524, 529 (“Not all plea agreements are reduced
to writing.”).
29 A Westlaw search uncovered hundreds of federal cases featuring oral plea agree-
ments.  Some of these were placed on the record at the plea hearing, but many were not,
leading to subsequent disputes about their enforcement. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes,
726 F.3d 656, 663 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The confusion this case brings was seeded by the gov-
ernment’s oral plea agreement with Hughes . . . .”); United States v. James, 54 F. App’x
681, 681 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that defendant pleaded guilty “pursuant to a verbal plea
agreement with the United States”).
States with rules requiring written agreements also continue to feature violations of
this rule. See, e.g., Freeman v. State, No. 20A04-1111-CR-619, 2012 WL 1073636, at*1 (Ind.
Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2012) (unpublished table decision) (“[C]ourts must enforce agreements
between the prosecution and a defendant, even if those agreements are oral and therefore
outside the statutory framework, either if the State has materially benefitted from the terms
of the agreement or if the defendant has relied on the terms of the agreement to his
substantial detriment.” (quoting Badger v. State, 637 N.E.2d 800, 804 (Ind. 1994))); State
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ment is filed with the court or disclosed on the record that it becomes acces-
sible to the public.30
Even when a plea agreement is disclosed on the record, it does not
always provide adequate transparency, for several reasons.  First, it may not
contain the full terms of the bargain.31  Omissions are especially likely if the
parties are attempting to conceal a fact bargain from the court.32  Even when
a plea agreement is in writing and lays out all the applicable terms, it usually
does not provide a justification for the terms negotiated.33  Nor does it dis-
close the steps that led to the final agreement, including terms rejected or
modified.
The failure to record plea offers and plea agreements is part of a
broader problem of lack of transparency in the criminal justice system, par-
ticularly with respect to prosecutorial decisionmaking.  Prosecutors are not
required to provide reasons for their charging or plea-bargaining decisions,
nor are they required to publicize any policies that they may follow in reach-
ing those decisions.34  Even when prosecutors do record the charging and
plea decisions, these data often remain “buried” in paper files.35  And while
criminal case data are becoming increasingly digitized, information about
v. Thomas, No. W1999-00337-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 721054, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June
26, 2001) (discussing a motion to enforce a verbal plea agreement).
30 See infra Part II.
31 See United States v. Alexander, 736 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (N.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 901
F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1990) (“This informal understanding, characterized as a ‘Gentlemen’s
Agreement’ during the June 20 hearing, although referred to in the first draft of the plea
agreement, see Government’s Exh 5, did not find its way into the final plea agreement.”);
United States v. A Parcel of Land Located at 5185 S. Westwood Drive, Republic, Mo. 65738,
No. 09-03357-CV-S-DGK, 2012 WL 1113197, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 2, 2012) (“In addition to
the written terms of the Plea Agreement, the United States verbally agreed to dismiss the
forfeiture action against the Defendant $17,305.00 in United States currency and to return
the money to Bishop.”); BIBAS, supra note 4, at 31 (“Pleas result from back-room discus-
sions, the terms of particular bargains often remain hidden, and prosecutors neither follow
clear rules nor offer clear explanations for offering particular deals or not.”).
32 On the attempts by parties to conceal certain bargains from the court, see generally
Thea Johnson, Fictional Pleas, 94 IND. L.J. 855 (2019); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H.
Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its
Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1289–90 (1997).
33 See BIBAS, supra note 4, at 31.
34 Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
1027–28 (2006) (“Prosecutors . . . need not explain why they agreed to reach a deal with
one defendant but refused to do so with another defendant guilty of the same crime.
Indeed, because prosecutors need not make the terms of their plea bargains available to
the public through publication and because prosecutorial law enforcement is largely
exempt from open government laws like FOIA, a defendant might not even know that
another similarly situated defendant received a particular deal.  Nor may defendants be
aware that a prosecutor is diverging from office policy.” (footnotes omitted)); Angela J.
Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 35
n.106 (1998) (“Prosecutors are not routinely required to justify or give reasons for charg-
ing or other discretionary decisions.”).
35 See, e.g., FORTIER, supra note 25, at 9.
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different steps in the process often remains spread across multiple systems
and databases.  As a result, tracking how a plea offer fits with other decisions
made in the course of a case, from pretrial to sentencing, and comparing
cases based on their characteristics remains a daunting task.36  Detecting and
analyzing patterns in prosecutorial charging and plea decisions is likewise a
continuing challenge.37
The stage at which the defendant formally tenders a guilty plea before
the court—known as a plea hearing or plea colloquy—occurs in public and
can provide some transparency.38  At this hearing, the court must ask ques-
tions to determine whether the guilty plea is voluntary, knowing, and factu-
ally based.39  If sufficiently probing, these questions could reveal the full
terms of the underlying bargain.
But in practice, the public plea hearing fails to compensate for the many
unknowns earlier in the bargaining process.  Plea hearings tend to be brief
affairs and usually do not unearth less visible charge and fact bargains or the
reasons behind any plea concessions.40  Furthermore, because plea hearings
occur only after the parties have agreed on a disposition, the parties have
every incentive to keep from the court facts that may disturb the agree-
ment.41  Defendants thus give “scripted responses” to the judge’s formulaic
questions and read statements prepared by their lawyers ahead of time.42
Sentencing hearings provide another opportunity for the public to learn
the factors that shaped the outcome of a negotiated case.  But sentencing
hearings are also frequently brief and uninformative—particularly when the
parties have agreed upon a sentence.  These hearings often fail to clarify
whether and in what way the negotiations influenced the ultimate sentence.
They rarely reveal whether or what charges were dropped, reduced, or
declined.43  In a negotiated case, the parties have agreed on a sentence or
sentence recommendation, so they often have no incentive to argue about
the sentence at the hearing.  Furthermore, if the defendant rejects a plea
offer and is convicted after a trial, the sentencing hearing does not disclose
36 See, e.g., ROBIN OLSEN, LEIGH COURTNEY, CHLOE WARNBERG & JULIE SAMUELS, URB.
INST., COLLECTING AND USING DATA FOR PROSECUTORIAL DECISIONMAKING: FINDINGS FROM
2018 NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES 11–12 (2018).
37 See, e.g., FORTIER, supra note 25, at 1–2.
38 See infra notes 72–79 and accompanying text.
39 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.170(k); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 596 (2020); 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.4(f), Westlaw (database
updated Dec. 2019).
40 See, e.g., Wright & Miller, supra note 4, at 1411–12; infra notes 264–66 and accompa-
nying text.
41 For an example of a judge learning facts about a case from the presentencing report
which the parties had not presented to the court at the plea hearing in an effort not to
undermine a charge bargain, see In re Ellis, 356 F.3d 1198, 1232 (9th Cir. 2004).
42 See BIBAS, supra note 4, at 26; Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 751
(2010).
43 See Wright & Miller, supra note 4, at 1411–12.
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the differential between the rejected plea offer and the posttrial sentence.  In
brief, much plea-related information is absent from the sentencing hearing,
so its publicity does not make up for the opacity of the process that precedes
it in negotiated cases.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT TO PUBLIC CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
The lack of transparency in plea bargaining contrasts sharply with our
longstanding legal commitment to public criminal proceedings.  This com-
mitment is rooted in the English common law44 and enshrined in the Sixth
Amendment, which provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a . . . public trial.”45  State constitutions, statutes, and
judicial decisions have long affirmed the same principle.46  Open criminal
proceedings were conceived as a fundamental right for criminal defendants
because of the recognition that transparency helps ensure fair treatment:
“The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous
review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible
abuse of judicial power.”47
The publicity of criminal proceedings is further safeguarded by the First
Amendment.48  As the Supreme Court has explained, the rights to free
speech and free press presuppose the right to receive information about the
workings of the government—including how criminal proceedings are han-
dled.49  The First Amendment thus “goes beyond protection of the press and
the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the
44 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266–68 (1948) (“This nation’s accepted practice of guar-
anteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in our English common law heritage.”).
45 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
46 As the Supreme Court explained:
In this country the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial first
appeared in a state constitution in 1776.  Following the ratification in 1791 of the
Federal Constitution’s Sixth Amendment, which commands that “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . .”
most of the original states and those subsequently admitted to the Union adopted
similar constitutional provisions.  Today almost without exception every state by
constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials be open
to the public.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 266–68 (omission original) (footnotes omitted); see also Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 567 (1980); Kenneth Katkin, “Incorporation” of
the Criminal Procedure Amendments: The View from the States, 84 NEB. L. REV. 397, 444–45
(2005) (discussing state law protecting the right to public trial).
47 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270.
48 See U.S. Const. amend. I.
49 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575 (“These expressly guaranteed freedoms [of
speech, press, and assembly] share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of com-
munication on matters relating to the functioning of government.  Plainly it would be diffi-
cult to single out any aspect of government of higher concern and importance to the
people than the manner in which criminal trials are conducted; as we have shown, recogni-
tion of this pervades the centuries-old history of open trials and the opinions of this
Court.”); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
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stock of information from which members of the public may draw.”50  Today,
courts frequently view the Sixth and First Amendment rights to a public crim-
inal proceeding as coextensive.
In deciding how broadly to apply the constitutional provisions on public-
ity, courts examine the functions and purposes of these provisions.  Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, the right to a public trial helps ensure fair
treatment of the defendant and advances the truth-seeking goal of the justice
system.51  Public proceedings can enhance the accuracy of the outcome by
encouraging witnesses to come forward.52  The possibility of public scrutiny
also encourages participants to follow the rules, remain impartial, and stay
“keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility” in dispensing justice.53 As Jus-
tice Harlan remarked, “the public-trial guarantee embodies a view of human
nature, true as a general rule, that judges, lawyers, witnesses, and jurors will
perform their respective functions more responsibly in an open court than in
secret proceedings.”54  By promoting the fairness and integrity of the pro-
ceedings, public access benefits not only the defendant, but also “society as a
whole.”55
Openness is also critical to ensuring that the proceedings are perceived as
fair and legitimate.  As the Supreme Court has explained, “public access to
the criminal trial fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening pub-
50 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575–76 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
51 See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct. for the Cnty. of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596,
606 (1982) (“Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the
integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as a
whole.”).
52 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 n.24 (first citing 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1834, at 435 (rev. vol. 1976); and then citing Tanksley v. United
States, 145 F.2d 58, 59 (9th Cir. 1944)).
53 Id. at 270 n.25 (quoting 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION 379 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 6th ed. 1890)).  In other words, publicity reduces
the risk of misconduct, false statements, and biased judgments. See Richmond Newspapers,
448 U.S. at 569 (“Both Hale in the 17th century and Blackstone in the 18th saw the impor-
tance of openness to the proper functioning of a trial; it gave assurance that the proceed-
ings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the misconduct of
participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality.” (first citing MATTHEW HALE,
THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL PART OF THE
LAW 343–45 (London, Henry Butterworth 6th ed. 1820); and then citing 3 WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *372–73)).
54 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also In re Oliver,
333 U.S. at 270 n.25 (“The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused;
that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the
presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their respon-
sibility and to the importance of their functions[.]” (quoting 1 COOLEY, supra note 53, at
379)).
55 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606.
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lic respect for the judicial process.”56  Writing for a plurality in Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia, Chief Justice Burger noted the longstanding common-
law position that openness of criminal proceedings has a “therapeutic value”
for the community and enhances “public acceptance of both the process and
its results.”57  As he elaborated, “[p]eople in an open society do not demand
infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what
they are prohibited from observing.”58
Critically, publicity allows citizens to monitor judicial proceedings for
unfairness and injustice and to hold governmental officials accountable for
such abuses.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly called attention to this long-
standing function of publicity, noting that the public trial “guarantee has
always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our
courts as instruments of persecution.  The knowledge that every criminal trial
is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.”59  Public criminal pro-
ceedings allow the community to hear and evaluate the reasons given for
acquitting or convicting a defendant of particular charges and, in the event
of a conviction, the reasons for a particular punishment.  Such transparency
of reasoning is important to ensuring that a verdict is based on the facts and
the law and not on partiality or incompetence.  As legal philosopher Jeremy
Bentham declared, “Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in
comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small account.”60
Finally, public proceedings inform citizens about the functioning of the
criminal justice system.  This knowledge allows them to “effectively partici-
pate in and contribute to our republican system of self-government.”61  Citi-
zens who have seen firsthand the imperfections and injustices of the criminal
process are better able to advocate for reforming it.62  Public access not only
ensures a fair proceeding for the defendant, but also guarantees to the public
a right to witness how criminal justice in its name is dispensed.  For that rea-
son, the right to a public trial does not belong merely to the accused, but is
rather “a shared right of the accused and the public, the common concern
being the assurance of fairness.”63
56 Id.; see also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 n. 24 (noting as a benefit of public access that
“spectators learn about their government and acquire confidence in their judicial reme-
dies” (first citing 6 WIGMORE, supra note 52, § 1834, at 435; then citing State v. Keeler, 156
P. 1080 (Mont. 1916); and then citing 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE
525 (London, Hunt & Clarke 1827))).
57 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570–71.
58 Id. at 572.
59 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270.
60 Id. at 271 (quoting 1 BENTHAM, supra note 56, at 524).
61 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604.
62 See Simonson, supra note 9, at 2200–01, 2211 (arguing that public access to criminal
proceedings “enhances self-government and democracy among local citizenry”).
63 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal. for Riverside Cnty. (Press-Enterprise II),
478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986).
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While the text of the Sixth Amendment speaks of the defendant’s right
to a public trial, courts have extended both the Sixth Amendment and the
First Amendment rights of public access to a range of nontrial proceedings,
including some relating to plea bargaining.  In determining whether public
access applies to a nontrial judicial proceeding, courts have applied the
“experience and logic” test.  Under it, they examine “whether the place and
process have historically been open to the press and general public” and
“whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of
the particular process in question.”64  Public access is more likely to be
granted if it “would serve as a curb on prosecutorial or judicial misconduct or
would further the public’s interest in understanding the criminal justice
system.”65
Courts have generally “protect[ed] access unless its denial is longstand-
ing and functionally necessary.”66  Grand jury proceedings, for example,
remain secret because they have historically been exempt from public access
and secrecy is necessary for their proper functioning.67  By contrast, under
the logic and experience test, courts have extended the right of access to
other nontrial criminal proceedings, including jury selection68 and prelimi-
nary,69 suppression,70 and sentencing hearings.71
Courts have also applied the right of public access to plea hearings.72
Accordingly, governments must take all reasonably available measures to
accommodate such access.73  The extension of publicity rights to plea hear-
ings makes sense in a world where jury trials are the exception and guilty
64 Id. at 8.
65 Oregonian Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Or., 920 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th
Cir. 1990).
66 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 39, § 24.1(a).
67 Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979) (explaining
that publicity would discourage witnesses to come forward and “testify fully and frankly,” as
they would fear retribution and would be subject to inducements; that publicity would
increase the risk that the suspect would flee or try to tamper with the grand jury; and that
suspects who are ultimately exonerated do not suffer “public ridicule” during the proceed-
ings (footnote omitted)).
68 See generally Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017); Presley v. Georgia, 558
U.S. 209, 215 (2010) (per curiam); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., Riverside
Cnty., 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
69 Press Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 7 (“[T]he First Amendment question cannot be
resolved solely on the label we give the event, i.e., ‘trial’ or otherwise, particularly where
the preliminary hearing functions much like a full-scale trial.”).
70 See generally Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
71 See Simonson, supra note 9, at 2195, 2208, 2216–19; Memorandum from Sara Sun
Beale & Nancy King to the Cooperator Subcomm. (July 21, 2016), in ADVISORY COMM. ON
CRIM. RULES, supra note 13, at 217 [hereinafter Beale & King Memorandum].
72 See, e.g., In re Copley Press, Inc., 518 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 199–202 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 87
(2d Cir. 1988); In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir.1986); Lilly v. State, 365
S.W.3d 321, 331–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
73 See Lilly, 365 S.W.3d at 332; Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 202–05.
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pleas are the norm.74  In fact, the bypass of the jury, which during trial serves
as “an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge,” makes public access to
plea-related proceedings “even more significant.”75  The presence of the
public at plea hearings can help ensure fairness by “monitoring the adminis-
tration of justice by plea.”76  It helps “discourag[e] either the prosecutor or
the court from engaging in arbitrary or wrongful conduct.”77  Public access
to plea hearings and sentencing hearings also “reveals the basis on which
society imposes punishment.”78  It informs the community about the opera-
tion of the criminal justice system and enables more effective public partici-
pation in democratic government.79
A number of courts have also confirmed a Sixth Amendment and First
Amendment right of public access to plea agreements and plea hearing tran-
scripts.80  This result flows out of caselaw affirming that the right of public
access to criminal proceedings “extends to the documents filed in connec-
tion with those proceedings.”81  Besides the Constitution, the common law
further protects access to judicial documents.82
The right of access to public plea agreements hinges on the agreements
being judicial records—that is, being filed with the court or disclosed on the
record at the plea hearing.83  Accordingly, in jurisdictions where plea agree-
ments are not placed on record with the court, the doctrine of public access
does little to ensure transparency in plea bargaining.  Likewise, the right of
public access does not extend to plea offers—at least not to those offers that,
as is the custom, have not been placed on the record.84
74 In re Copley Press, 518 F.3d at 1027 (noting that “it stands to reason that plea collo-
quies, which ‘serve[ ] as a substitute for a trial,’ should also be open to the public” (altera-
tion original) (quoting In re Wash. Post, 807 F.2d at 389)); Oregonian Publ’g Co. v. U.S.
Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Or., 920 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Wash. Post, 807 F.2d
at 389; 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 39, § 24.1(a); Simonson, supra note 9, at 2174–78,
2194–95.
75 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal. for Riverside Cnty. (Press-Enterprise II),
478 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1986) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
76 United States v. DeJournett, 817 F.3d 479, 485 (6th Cir. 2016); see also Wash. Post v.
Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Oregonian Publ’g Co., 920 F.2d at 1465.
77 In re Wash. Post, 807 F.2d at 389.
78 United States v. Danovaro, 877 F.2d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 1989).
79 Simonson, supra note 9, at 2200–01, 2211.
80 See, e.g., In re Copley Press, Inc., 518 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2008); DeJournett, 817
F.3d at 485; Wash. Post, 935 F.2d at 288; Oregonian Publ’g Co., 920 F.2d at 1465; United
States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1988).
81 Beale & King Memorandum, supra note 71, at 220 (citing authorities).
82 See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
83 See, e.g., United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States
v. Ring, 47 F. Supp. 3d 38, 41–42 (D.D.C. 2014); cf. Ex parte Birmingham News Co., 624 So.
2d 1117, 1131 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (“Until such time as a defendant is about to enter a
guilty plea, however, there is no requirement of disclosure.”).
84 See, e.g., El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d at 163; Ring, 47 F. Supp. 3d at 41–42.
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The few courts that have considered the question have also refused to
extend the First and Sixth Amendment rights of public access to plea negoti-
ations.85  As one court explained, such negotiations are “private matters
between the parties,” they have not “historically been open to the press and
general public,” and “public access to such negotiations could obviously play
a significantly harmful role, rather than ‘a significantly positive role[,] in the
functioning of the [negotiation] process.’”86  The court never elaborated
why public access would “obviously” harm plea negotiations, leaving the func-
tion and desirability of secrecy in such negotiations unexamined.
In brief, while constitutional rights of access extend to proceedings and
records that document the final outcome of plea negotiations, the negotia-
tions themselves remain shielded from access under the assumption that
neither experience nor logic calls for greater disclosure.  The next two Parts
critically examine the reasons for and against transparency in plea bargain-
ing, showing the limits to the assumption that secrecy in plea negotiations is
functionally necessary.
III. REASONS FOR NONTRANSPARENCY
The lack of transparency of plea bargaining was not the product of rea-
soned deliberation about its costs and benefits.  Rather, it reflected uncer-
tainty about the legality and desirability of plea bargaining itself.87  Plea deals
were not officially sanctioned by the Supreme Court and state legislatures
until the early 1970s.88  As the 1967 report of a task force of the President’s
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice explained:
There [wa]s ordinarily no formal recognition that the defendant has been
offered an inducement to plead guilty.  Although the participants and fre-
quently the judge kn[e]w that negotiation ha[d] taken place, the prosecutor
and defendant . . . ordinarily [had to] go through a courtroom ritual in
which they deny that the guilty plea is the result of any threat or promise.89
85 See, e.g., Birmingham News Co., 624 So. 2d at 1131; State v. Lopez, 497 A.2d 390, 397
(Conn. 1985) (holding that “neither the defendant nor the public is entitled to attend”
plea negotiations); cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 598 n. 23
(1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Nor does this opinion intimate that judges are
restricted in their ability to conduct conferences in chambers, inasmuch as such confer-
ences are distinct from trial proceedings.”); United States v. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d 103, 107
(8th Cir. 1976) (noting judicial policy to encourage plea negotiations, which makes it
“essential that . . . negotiations remain confidential to the parties if they are unsuccessful”).
86 Birmingham News Co., 624 So. 2d at 1131 (alterations in original) (quoting Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal. for Riverside Cnty. (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8
(1986)).
87 See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–6,
19–21 (1979). See generally William Ortman, When Plea Bargaining Became Normal, 100 B.U.
L. REV. 1435 (2020).
88 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970); Alschuler, supra note 87, at 40.
89 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUST., TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 9 (1967), quoted in In re Ellis, 356 F.3d 1198, 1231 (9th Cir.
2004).
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Given the disapproval and sometimes outright illegality of plea bargain-
ing, the parties conducted their discussions behind closed doors and created
no documentation of the agreements they reached.90
In the 1970s, as plea bargains became accepted by the courts, a move-
ment toward documenting at least some elements of these bargains arose.
The Supreme Court required that a court must examine the knowledge and
voluntariness of guilty pleas on the record.91  Many jurisdictions further man-
dated courts to determine the factual basis of a guilty plea on the record.92
Yet the process of negotiating a plea agreement remained shielded from
outside scrutiny.  The following Sections examine the justifications given for
continued lack of transparency in plea bargaining.
A. Encouraging Candor in Negotiations
A common reason given for confidentiality in plea negotiations is that it
is necessary to encourage candor among the participants.  If the parties were
concerned that their statements and offers would become public, the reason-
ing goes, they may not be as forthcoming or flexible in the negotiations.
Under this view, publicity may discourage some parties to engage in the pro-
cess altogether.  As the Eighth Circuit explained:
Plea bargaining has been recognized as an essential component of the
administration of justice.  “Properly administered, it is to be encouraged.”  If
such a policy is to be fostered, it is essential that plea negotiations remain
confidential to the parties if they are unsuccessful.  Meaningful dialogue
between the parties would, as a practical matter, be impossible if either party
had to assume the risk that plea offers would be admissible in evidence.93
In most cases, courts make these arguments in favor of confidentiality
when rejecting demands to introduce evidence of a plea offer in a subse-
90 Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61,
82 (2015) (quoting the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11 advisory committee
notes to 1974 amendment and noting that plea bargaining at the time was “informal and
largely invisible”).
91 Brady, 397 U.S. at 747 n.4; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241–44 (1969).
92 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3); 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 39, § 21.4(f).
93 United States v. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted)
(quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971)); see also Jenkins v. State, 493
S.W.3d 583, 607–08 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“[A]llowing a defendant to introduce evi-
dence at trial of a sentence offered by the State during plea negotiations clearly militates
against public policy favoring the conclusion of litigation by compromise and settlement
because it discourages the State from making such offers in the future.”); United States v.
El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Public access to unconsummated plea
agreements cannot be squared with the confidentiality required for candid negotiations.”);
Motion to Quash Subpoenas Improperly Seeking Irrelevant and Protected Material from
Criminal Case at 8, United States v. BNP Paribas SA, No. 4:11-CV-3718, 2013 WL 10197924
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2013) (“As noted by many courts, such disclosure would also discourage
other parties from being as forthright and candid in future plea negotiations.”).
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quent civil or criminal proceeding.94  Rules of evidence and related caselaw
already prohibit such use of plea offers and plea-related statements and
therefore mitigate the risk that disclosure would inhibit negotiations.95
These rules also help protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial should nego-
tiations fall apart.96
Still, concerns about inhibiting candor have merit when it comes to the
idea of conducting negotiations entirely in public.  Requiring the parties to
negotiate in public would, at least in some cases, impair their ability to be
fully forthcoming and reach a compromise.  For example, if the parties had
to bargain in public, they would likely be wary of conceding weakness in the
evidence supporting their case or strength in the evidence supporting the
opponent’s case.  Such concessions are often key to the success of plea nego-
tiations, and discouraging the parties from making them would stand in the
way of compromise.  Publicity would be particularly problematic in high-pro-
file cases where media coverage of the negotiations could also taint the jury
pool should the negotiations fall apart and the case proceed to trial.97
Finally, public negotiations would also be problematic in cases where the
prosecution is seeking the cooperation of the defendant, a point discussed
further in Section III.C.  Proposals to open plea bargaining to the public
must take these concerns into account.
B. Protecting Prosecutorial Discretion
Secrecy may also be defended on the ground that it enables prosecutors
to use their discretion to exercise mercy where the circumstances warrant it.
The lack of transparency limits oversight of prosecutorial decisions, so it gives
94 See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1365 (5th Cir. 1978); Verdoorn,
528 F.2d at 107; Jenkins, 493 S.W.3d at 607–08. But cf. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d at 163 (making
this argument in the context of a media request to access a draft plea agreement).
95 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 410; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f); Robertson, 582 F.2d at 1365
(stressing that even before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts recog-
nized “the inescapable truth that for plea bargaining to work effectively and fairly, a defen-
dant must be free to negotiate without fear that his statements will later be used against
him” (quoting United States v. Herman, 544 F.2d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 1977); and citing
United States v. Ross, 493 F.2d 771, 775 (5th Cir. 1974)); Jenkins, 493 S.W.3d at 607–08
(“[A]llowing a defendant to introduce evidence at trial of a sentence offered by the State
during plea negotiations clearly militates against public policy favoring the conclusion of
litigation by compromise and settlement because it discourages the State from making
such offers in the future.”); id. at 607 (“We have held that a State’s plea offer, presented by
a capital defendant at the punishment phase, might be ‘minimally relevant’ as tending to
show the District Attorney’s office’s belief that the defendant is not a future danger.  Nev-
ertheless, such evidence is not admissible under Rule 403 because it is ‘substantially out-
weighed by the danger of both unfair prejudice and of misleading the jury.’  Admitting
evidence of plea negotiation also runs the risk of confusing the issues by leading the jury
down a path of inquiry into the motivations behind each party’s plea offer.” (footnotes
omitted)).
96 Cf. United States v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., No. H-07-434, 2008 WL 501321, at *18
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2008).
97 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 18 21-JAN-21 9:50
990 notre dame law review [vol. 96:3
prosecutors greater freedom to reduce or modify charges to provide leniency
in the face of rigid criminal laws.
Many commentators view prosecutorial discretion to dispense mercy
during plea bargaining as necessary in light of the severity of our sentencing
laws and the draconian collateral consequences that may accompany crimi-
nal convictions.98  This view rests on the assumption that, based on their
expertise and their understanding of the facts and the law in a particular
case, prosecutors are better situated to determine what disposition is in the
public’s interest than other relevant actors, such as legislatures, judges, or the
public.
American prosecutors have historically enjoyed broad discretion in
charging decisions because principles of separation of powers have been
interpreted to prevent judges from interfering with those decisions.99  As
part of plea bargaining, prosecutors may agree to reduce or modify charges
to ameliorate the harshness of the penalty that the defendant faces—a severe
mandatory sentencing minimum, a harsh sentencing enhancement, or a
drastic collateral consequence, such as deportation.100  The lack of trans-
parency means that prosecutors do not need to justify their charging choices
to the public; very often, their charging choices also remain effectively hid-
den from supervisors and the court.101
Some worry that if the parties were forced to expose plea negotiations to
public scrutiny, prosecutors might be more reluctant to agree to “creative”
plea bargains that stretch the law to provide leniency.102  Such bargains
might be perceived by superiors or by the public as underenforcing the law
or “going easy” on a defendant for improper reasons.  Accordingly, while
transparency does not formally limit prosecutorial discretion, it may effec-
98 Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109 PENN
ST. L. REV. 1087, 1104 (2005) (“Perhaps the only way to remove some of the severity [of
our sentencing laws] is to allow prosecutors to operate quietly, dispensing mercy in a few
cases, even if it is done inconsistently.”); see also Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power
Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 853–56 (2018) (quoting and
agreeing with Wright).
99 Judges can reject charges that are not supported by probable cause, but cannot
prevent a prosecutor from dismissing or reducing charges. See, e.g., Darryl Brown, The
Judicial Role in Criminal Charging and Plea Bargaining, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 63, 63–66 (2017)
(noting that this is the standard role of judges in the federal and most state systems, but
then proceeding to outline ways in which judges could influence prosecutorial decisions to
reduce or decline charges in certain states and certain contexts).
100 See BRUCE FREDERICK & DON STEMEN, THE ANATOMY OF DISCRETION: AN ANALYSIS OF
PROSECUTORIAL DECISION MAKING—TECHNICAL REPORT 47–48, 176–79, 195–98 (2012);
Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J 1197, 1215–16 (2016); Thea
Johnson, Measuring the Creative Plea Bargain, 92 IND. L.J. 901, 930–33 (2017); Wright et al.,
supra note 23 (manuscript at 5–6, 22–26).
101 FORTIER, supra note 25, at 1–2, 9.
102 Cf. Bellin, supra note 98, at 853–56; Johnson, supra note 32, at 875 (noting the
benefits of the lack of transparency for prosecutors who wish to “enforce the criminal law,
while not having defendants ‘suffer enormous and disproportionate consequences’”);
Wright, supra note 98, at 1104.
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tively do so in practice by discouraging prosecutors from entering into plea
bargains that stretch the facts or the law to protect defendants from unduly
punitive consequences.
C. Shielding Cooperators from Harm
Another argument for confidentiality in plea bargaining is that it is nec-
essary to protect cooperating defendants from retaliation.  Cooperation is
vital to the success of many complex prosecutions; at the federal level, coop-
eration agreements are used in at least ten percent of criminal cases.103  Yet
recent studies have revealed that cooperators frequently face threats and
sometimes actual violence (especially in detention) if it becomes known that
they have assisted the government.104  Some observers have therefore argued
against making plea agreements or plea-related documents public, to the
extent that these might disclose the cooperation of a defendant and place
him at risk or discourage future defendants from cooperating.105
The experience of the federal system with publicly filed plea agreements
illustrates some of the problems with exposing plea agreements to the public.
Plea agreements generally disclose whether a defendant has agreed to coop-
erate, as this is a critical concession on which the government’s promises to
drop charges or recommend a sentence reduction might hinge.  Conse-
quently, when a plea agreement is placed on the record, and the record is
made available to the public electronically, criminal associates can find out
that a defendant has cooperated and may threaten to harm him or his fam-
ily.106  This in turn jeopardizes the success of ongoing investigations that
depend on the cooperation of those who are threatened and deters other
defendants from assisting the government.
In a 2015 Federal Judicial Center “Survey of Harm to Cooperators,” 976
federal judge respondents reported “571 instances of harm or threat” to
defendants and witnesses and 31 murders of cooperating defendants within
the preceding three years.107  The survey found further that “[t]he plea
agreement or plea supplement was the document most frequently used to
identify a defendant/offender as a cooperator—a minimum of 135
instances.”108  Intimidation is not a concern in every case in which there is
cooperation, and in many cases, the risk of intimidation cannot be elimi-
nated by confidentiality, as “there will often be alternative sources of informa-
103 D. Brock Hornby, Can Federal Sentencing Remain Transparent?, JUDICATURE, Spring
2019, at 46, 47.
104 MARGARET S. WILLIAMS, DONNA STIENSTRA & MARVIN ASTRADA, FED. JUD. CTR., SUR-
VEY OF HARM TO COOPERATORS: FINAL REPORT 8, 10 (2016). See generally Panel Five: Coopera-
tion and Plea Agreements—Judges’ Roundtable, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 85 (2010) [hereinafter
Cooperation and Plea Agreements].
105 E.g., Cooperation and Plea Agreements, supra note 104, at 92–95.
106 David L. Snyder, Note, Nonparty Remote Electronic Access to Plea Agreements in the Second
Circuit, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1263, 1265, 1271–72 (2008).
107 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 104, 8, 10.
108 Id. at 13.
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tion about cooperators.”109  Still, the data from the survey of harm to
cooperators indicate that this is a concern that must be taken seriously.
D. Conserving Criminal Justice Resources
Some commentators have advanced practical arguments in favor of con-
tinued secrecy.  They have argued that documenting plea discussions or plea
offers would be time consuming and unfeasible.110  Particularly in large
urban jurisdictions, prosecutors and defense attorneys carry heavy caseloads
and depend on quick and informal bargaining to dispose of cases
efficiently.111
Memorializing plea offers and providing reasons for the offers would
mean taking time away from completing other prosecutions.  Placing offers
on the record with the court would also absorb valuable time and resources
of the court as well as the parties.  Additionally, the installation, mainte-
nance, and proper use of digital databases in which plea data would be
recorded may have significant startup costs.  The challenges of operating dig-
ital databases are likely to be particularly daunting for smaller, rural offices,
which tend to lack resources and qualified staff to maintain and operate the
necessary data management systems.112  States will need to consider these
burdens in assessing whether and how to record and disclose plea-bargaining
data.
IV. THE COSTS OF NONTRANSPARENCY
While legitimate reasons support maintaining some aspects of plea bar-
gaining confidential, lawmakers and courts must also consider the important
interests that weigh against such secrecy.  These concern the very fairness
and legitimacy of plea bargaining and will therefore often outweigh at least
the practical and logistical considerations in favor of maintaining plea-bar-
gaining confidentiality.
109 Beale & King Memorandum, supra note 71, at 237.  For example, cooperation fre-
quently requires testimony against a codefendant, and such testimony, unless closed to the
public (which is rare), reveals the cooperator’s assistance to the government.
110 See In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 756 n.7 (Cal. 1992) (“[M]emorializing plea bargain
discussions in this particular manner could be burdensome in high-volume courts were it
to be followed as a general practice.”); Schneider & Alkon, supra note 4, at 454–59 (noting
commentators’ concerns about resources in implementing more robust plea data collec-
tion by courts); Graham C. Polando, Being Honest About Chance: Mitigating Lafler v.
Cooper’s Costs, 3 HLRE: OFF REC. 61, 66 (2013).
111 See In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d at 756 n.7; Polando, supra note 110, at 66. See generally
Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, Essay, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261 (2011).
112 OLSEN ET AL., supra note 36, at 10; see also P. Leila Barghouty, The Police Avoid
Requests for Their Records by Simply Not Keeping Any, THE OUTLINE (Sept. 3, 2019), https://
theoutline.com/post/7901/the-police-avoid-requests-for-their-records-by-simply-not-keep-
ing-any?zd=1&zi=eucwm7jr (noting difficulties that law enforcement agencies, especially in
rural areas, have had in maintaining digital databases).
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A. Concealing Disparate Treatment of Similarly Situated Defendants
The lack of transparency makes it difficult for attorneys, judges, and the
public to monitor the process and detect when similarly situated defendants
are not treated equally in the plea-bargaining process.  Because there are no
searchable databases of plea offers, defense attorneys often do not know what
the “going rate” for plea bargains in particular cases are, particularly if the
attorneys are not part of a public defender’s office, are relatively inexperi-
enced in handling the type of case at issue, or are new to the jurisdiction.113
Accordingly, they cannot be sure whether an offer they have received for a
client is reasonable and consistent with the norm.  Nor can they point to plea
precedent in arguing for equal treatment of their clients.
The lack of transparency also makes it more difficult for judges to evalu-
ate the fairness of plea bargains in deciding whether to accept a guilty plea
and whether to go along with the parties’ sentencing recommendation.  In
most U.S. jurisdictions today, judges cannot easily search plea or sentencing
precedents.  While average statistics might be available, databases that allow
them to compare case characteristics are not.114
The lack of transparency thus allows disparate treatment to remain hid-
den.  There is some preliminary evidence to suggest that similarly situated
defendants are not treated consistently in plea bargaining.  When scholars
have been able to access and review plea, charging, and sentencing data, they
have found disparities on the basis of wealth and race.115  These results sug-
gest that better documentation and transparency measures are necessary to
uncover and address unequal treatment in plea bargaining.
B. Hiding Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Plea Bargaining
The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel extends to plea negotiations.116  At a minimum,
counsel must inform her client of any plea offer by the prosecution and must
provide competent advice about the consequences of accepting or rejecting
the offer.117
113 See Levine et al., supra note 24, at 667.
114 See, e.g., Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing Infor-
mation Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351,
1366 (2005) (“No state provides sufficient information to answer the basic question: What
distribution of sentences has been imposed by other judges for similar cases?”); Samuel R.
Wiseman, The Criminal Justice Black Box, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 372–79, 382–83 (2017).
115 See generally KUTATELADZE ET AL., supra note 25; Carlos Berdejó, Criminalizing Race:
Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1187 (2018); Christi Metcalfe & Ted
Chiricos, Race, Plea, and Charge Reduction: An Assessment of Racial Disparities in the Plea Process,
35 JUST. Q. 223 (2018); David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing:
Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285 (2001); M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B.
Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320 (2014).
116 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012).
117 Id. at 145; Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162–163 (2012).
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As the Supreme Court has recognized, however, it is difficult to ensure
that defendants are receiving effective assistance if plea bargaining occurs off
the record.118  If offers made and concessions exchanged are not properly
documented, a court reviewing an ineffective assistance claim would have a
difficult time resolving, after the fact, whether a prosecutor did in fact extend
a plea offer that the attorney failed to convey, and if so, what the terms of
that offer were.
Going beyond constitutional claims of ineffective assistance, the lack of
searchable plea records inhibits proactive efforts by defense attorneys to
improve the assistance they provide during plea negotiations.119  Without
information about the standard plea deal for certain crimes, defense attor-
neys are likely to be less effective in negotiating with the prosecution.120  As
negotiation scholars Andrea Kupfer Schneider and Cynthia Alkon explain,
“In plea bargaining, defense counsel either can make the opening offer or
will be responding to the prosecutor.  In order to know what would be a good
and legitimate outcome . . . one needs information about other similarly situ-
ated defendants.”121
More broadly, the lack of information about what occurs during plea
negotiations—and how that affects outcomes—hinders efforts to develop
standards of quality representation.122  Pamela Metzger and Andrew Fergu-
son have argued that public defenders need to collect and analyze data about
defense inputs and outcomes to identify what strategies work and what com-
petent representation looks like.123  When information about a critical stage
of the process—plea bargaining—is missing, neither defender’s offices nor
bar associations have reliable measures by which to develop standards for
adequate representation.
C. Disguising the Trial Penalty
The lack of transparency also prevents the public from understanding
what trial penalties are imposed on those defendants who refuse plea offers
and proceed to trial.  Analysis of the average sentences received by those who
plead guilty and those who go to trial on particular charges suggests that
defendants are frequently penalized for exercising their Sixth Amendment
right to trial and that the penalty can be significant.124  Yet comparing aver-
118 See Frye, 566 U.S. at 146; Stern, supra note 14, at 250–51.
119 See generally Levine et al., supra note 24; Pamela Metzger & Andrew Guthrie Fergu-
son, Defending Data, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1057 (2015); Schneider & Alkon, supra note 4.
120 Schneider & Alkon, supra note 4, at 478 (quoting Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal
Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 105–06
(1995)).
121 Schneider & Alkon, supra note 4, at 477–78.
122 Id. at 473–74.
123 Metzger & Ferguson, supra note 119, at 1097, 1113.
124 See, e.g., Brian D. Johnson, Plea-Trial Differences in Federal Punishment: Research and
Policy Implications, 31 FED. SENT. REP. 256, 257 (2019) (“[O]n average, trial conviction
increases the odds of incarceration by two to six times and produces sentence lengths that
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age sentences is not a perfectly reliable way to measure the trial penalty, as
the groups of defendants who have pleaded guilty may be qualitatively differ-
ent from the groups of defendants who go to trial.  It is important, therefore,
to examine records of plea offers in cases where defendants proceed to trial
and to compare the plea offer to the posttrial sentence in the same case.
Until records of plea offers in cases that go to trial are publicly available, we
cannot determine with precision the size of trial penalties or the circum-
stances under which they are imposed.  The lack of data in turn limits public
discussion about whether and how to address factors that contribute to signif-
icant trial penalties.
D. Concealing the True Facts
The lack of transparency in plea bargaining also permits the parties to
conceal facts in the case from the public—and sometimes the court—to
achieve a mutually agreed upon result.  To obtain a less punitive outcome
while ensuring a quick and certain resolution of the case, the parties often
negotiate charge bargains that omit or misrepresent relevant facts.125  For
example, to avoid lifetime sex-offender registration, the parties may agree to
reduce a felony sexual assault charge to simple assault or a series of misde-
meanor sex offenses.126  To avoid deportation or the loss of occupational
licenses, felonies may be negotiated down to misdemeanors.127  To skirt
harsh mandatory minimum sentences, the presence of a gun during the com-
mission of a drug sale might be omitted or the quantity of drugs might be
recalculated and charges negotiated accordingly.128  Likewise, the prior
are 20 to 60 percent longer.” (citation omitted)); Andrew Chongseh Kim, Underestimating
the Trial Penalty: An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Trial Penalty and Critique of the Abrams
Study, 84 MISS. L.J. 1195, 1202 (2015) (finding that “federal defendants convicted at trial
receive sentences that are sixty-four percent longer than similar defendants who plead
guilty, excluding the effects of charge and fact bargaining”); Nancy J. King, David A. Soulé,
Sara Steen & Robert R. Weidner, When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After
Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959,
973–75, 992 (2005) (studying sentencing practices in five states and finding trial penalties
ranging from 13% to 461%); Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty
and Plea Bargaining Reform, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67, 89–90 (2005) (finding an average trial penalty
44.5 months greater than the sentence imposed after a guilty plea in state felony cases);
HUM. RTS. WATCH, AN OFFER YOU CAN’T REFUSE: HOW US FEDERAL PROSECUTORS FORCE
DRUG DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD GUILTY 102 (2013) (reporting that “the mean sentence for all
drug trafficking offenses in which conviction was obtained by plea was 5 years, 4 months,
and the mean sentence for cases in which conviction was obtained at trial was 16 years, i.e.,
three times longer” (footnote omitted)).
125 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 124, at 86–87; Mari Byrne, Note, Baseless Pleas: A
Mockery of Justice, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2964 (2010); Donnelly, supra note 4, at 430–35;
Johnson, supra note 32, at 855; Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 32, at 1293; Turner, supra
note 21, at 212–23.
126 Johnson, supra note 32, at 856–57.
127 See id. at 858.
128 Id. at 862–63.
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record of the offender might be minimized to evade very severe penalties for
recidivism.129
The practice of fact bargaining allows the parties to avoid the harsh con-
sequences dictated by rigid sentencing schemes and resolve the case with less
effort.130  Yet it can also subvert legislative and judicial authority to set appro-
priate criminal punishment.  Particularly when done off the record, fact bar-
gaining also conflicts with a central purpose of the criminal process—to seek
the truth about the case.131  In turn, this deepens public mistrust and disap-
proval of plea bargaining.132
Even if fact bargains might be justifiable in some cases, the secrecy of
plea bargaining prevents outsiders from learning how often and under what
circumstances fact bargains occur.133  And because the negotiations are off
the record, prosecutors do not need to concern themselves with providing
129 Id. at 863.
130 See id. at 858.
131 Id. at 859.
132 The few surveys that have examined public views of plea bargaining have generally
found high levels of disapproval. See, e.g., DAVID FOGEL, “. . . WE ARE THE LIVING
PROOF . . .”: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS 309 (2d ed. 1979) (noting a Michigan
survey finding public disapproval of plea bargaining between 67–70% in the years
1973–75); CANDACE MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA
64–65 (1993) (discussing nationwide and California surveys finding that a majority of the
public disapproved of plea bargaining); Robert F. Rich & Robert J. Sampson, Public Percep-
tions of Criminal Justice Policy: Does Victimization Make a Difference?, in 5 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS
109, 113–14 (1990) (noting a 1983 survey of Chicago residents finding that 64% of respon-
dents would like to see plea bargaining abolished); Ronald W. Fagan, Public Support for the
Courts: An Examination of Alternative Explanations, 9 J. CRIM. JUST. 403, 408 (1981) (noting a
Washington public opinion survey showing 82% support for the statement that prosecutors
“should try to convict the offender of the crime committed, not reduce the charge to a less
serious offense”). But cf. Johnson, supra note 20, at 153 (describing a survey of law stu-
dents finding that “respondents tended to describe plea bargaining in neutral to positive
terms”).
A major reason for the disapproval is the secrecy of the process, which makes it
“impossible to tell what the person had really done . . . or to understand if the punishment
really fit the crime.” MCCOY, supra, at 65; see also id. at 67; Sergio Herzog, Plea Bargaining
Practices: Less Covert, More Public Support?, 50 CRIME & DELINQ. 590, 590–92 (2004) (describ-
ing survey of Canadian public opinion and Israeli experimental study finding that lack of
transparency is a major reason for public disapproval of the practice).  In a report encour-
aging other countries to adopt the U.S. federal rules of publicly filed plea agreements in
cases involving business crimes, the Department of Justice likewise acknowledged that lack
of transparency is likely to breed public mistrust of plea bargaining.  Scott D. Hammond,
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., The U.S. Model of Negotiated Plea Agreements:
A Good Deal with Benefits for All 7 (Oct. 17, 2006) (transcript available at https://
www.justice.gov/atr/file/518421/download) (“[I]f corporate defendants were regularly
allowed to enter into secret deals with the government, investors, members of the public,
and the victims of the charged crime would naturally question the fairness and trans-
parency of the sentence imposed.”).
133 Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of
Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477, 524
(2002).
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any justification for factually baseless bargains.  In the end, lack of trans-
parency in the negotiations inhibits public discussion about the costs and
benefits of fact bargains, and it also cuts short debate about the underlying
problem—the severity of sentencing and collateral consequences that fact
bargains seek to avoid.
E. Undermining Victims’ Ability to Provide Input
Victims in criminal cases also have legitimate interests that can be
affected by plea bargaining.  These include the interests in uncovering the
facts of the case, seeing the criminal law properly enforced, and, if applica-
ble, obtaining redress for injuries inflicted by the defendant.134  When plea
bargaining occurs in private, between the prosecutor and defense attorney
only, victims’ interests can be overlooked.  Recognizing this risk, many states
and the federal government have adopted laws that require prosecutors to
inform victims of plea agreements, either before the agreements are finalized
by the parties or at least before they are presented to the court.135  However,
these laws have not been followed consistently in practice.136  The lack of
transparency in plea bargaining means that when a failure to follow the vic-
tim notification law occurs, it is often not uncovered in time to permit victims
to provide meaningful input into the process.
Consider the case of Jeffrey Epstein, the wealthy financier charged with
sexually assaulting and trafficking dozens of minor girls.137  Relying on his
political connections, wealth, and high-powered attorneys, Epstein was able
134 See generally Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L.Q.
301 (1987).
135 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9) (2018); see also Paul G. Cassell, Crime Victims’ Rights,
in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 227, 236–37.  Several states have recently
amended their laws to introduce or strengthen victim participation in plea bargaining. See,
e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(4); ME. STAT. tit. 15, § 812 (2019); MO. CONST. art. I,
§ 32(1)(2); NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-1201 (2020); S.D. CONST. art VI, § 29(7); see also Kathy
Leigh Berkowitz, Polk Woman Says Plea Deal Violated Rights as Victim Under Marsy’s Law—
Constitutional Amendment Passed by Florida Voters Intended to Increase Rights of Victims to Be
Informed, Participate in Criminal Cases, THE LEDGER (Feb. 22, 2019), https://
www.theledger.com/news/20190221/polk-woman-says-plea-deal-violated-rights-as-victim-
under-marsys-law—-constitutional-amendment-passed-by-florida-voters-intended-to-
increase-rights-of-victims-to-be-informed-participate-in-criminal-cases; Marsy’s Law Summary,
OHIO CRIME VICTIM JUST. CTR., https://www.ocvjc.org/marsys-law-summary (last visited
Nov. 3, 2020); Erin McCarthy Holliday, Pennsylvania Voters Approve Marsy’s Law Victims’
Rights Amendment with Constitutionality Question Pending, JURIST (Nov. 6, 2019), https://
www.jurist.org/news/2019/11/pennsylvania-voters-approve-marsys-law-victims-rights-
amendment-with-constitutionality-question-pending/.
136 See, e.g., BIBAS, supra note 4, at 35; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-54,
CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS ACT: INCREASING AWARENESS, MODIFYING THE COMPLAINT PROCESS,
AND ENHANCING COMPLIANCE MONITORING WILL IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACT
(2008); Cassell, supra note 135, at 249–50.
137 See Julie K. Brown, How a Future Trump Cabinet Member Gave a Serial Sex Abuser the Deal
of a Lifetime, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/
article220097825.html.
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to negotiate a plea deal that would spare him from federal prosecution and
net him a lenient sentence in state court.138  Critically, Epstein’s lawyers were
also able to negotiate that the deal be kept secret from both the public and
the alleged victims until it was too late for anyone to object.139  The lack of
transparency permanently affected the victims’ ability to receive redress for
their harms and the ability of the victims and the public to understand what
occurred.140
The failure to keep victims informed of proposed plea bargains affects
not only the victims’ interests, but also the public’s concern in uncovering
the truth and ensuring that justice is done.  It can also limit the court’s
understanding of the facts in the case and its ability to evaluate a plea bargain
fairly and accurately.  And it can diminish public confidence in the criminal
process.  Public opinion surveys about plea bargaining suggest that when vic-
tims and the public are kept in the dark about how the process operates, this
can deepen “citizen dissatisfaction with plea bargaining.”141
F. Frustrating Criminal Justice Reform Efforts
Over the last several years, the United States has witnessed the rise of a
broad social and political movement for transparent, data-based criminal jus-
tice.  The availability of new technology, from body cameras and cell phones
to big data analytics and social media, has made injustices in the criminal
justice system more apparent to the public.  At the same time, it has
encouraged a broad coalition of activists,142 prosecutors,143 lawmakers,144
138 Id.; Paul G. Cassell, Nathanael J. Mitchell & Bradley J. Edwards, Crime Victims’ Rights
During Criminal Investigations?: Applying the Crime Victims’ Rights Act Before Criminal Charges
Are Filed, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 68 (2014).
139 Brown, supra note 137; Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1218 (S.D. Fla.
2019) (finding that federal prosecutors concealed the bargain from the victims until after
its approval by the court and that this violated the Crime Victims’ Rights Act).
140 Brown, supra note 137; Doe 1, 359 F. Supp. 3d at 1218–19.
141 See ME. STAT. tit. 15, § 812(1) (2019); see also supra note 132.
142 See, e.g., FORTIER, supra note 25, at 9 (advocating for greater transparency in
prosecutorial decisionmaking and noting that similar calls for transparency “have come
from all sides: from voters, academics, public defenders, county legislatures . . . , and even
from prosecutors”); Harnessing Data To Improve Lives, ARNOLD VENTURES (Dec. 1, 2017),
https://www.arnoldventures.org/stories/harnessing-data-to-improve-lives/ (noting the
foundation’s support for “evidence-based policymaking,” including in criminal justice);
Our Story, MEASURES FOR JUST. [hereinafter MEASURES FOR JUST.], https://measuresforjus-
tice.org/about/overview/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2020) (noting as its mission to facilitate
reform by “collect[ing], standardiz[ing], and publiciz[ing] . . . criminal justice data”); Joe
Luppino-Esposito, Conservative Criminal Justice Reform Is Alive and Well on Capitol Hill, TEX.
PUB. POL’Y FOUND. (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.texaspolicy.com/conservative-criminal-
justice-reform-is-alive-and-well-on-capitol-hill (“Thanks to data-driven approaches that max-
imize efficiencies, conservatives are leading the way toward several key reforms.”).
143 See, e.g., Olsen et al., supra note 36, at 10; SUFFOLK CNTY. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF., THE
RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO 2, 9, 24 (2019) [hereinafter ROLLINS MEMO], http://
files.suffolkdistrictattorney.com/The-Rachael-Rollins-Policy-Memo.pdf (committing to
leading a data-driven office, collecting and analyzing data to shape prosecutorial decision-
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and scholars145 to call for solutions that big data enables, specifically,
broader collection and analysis of criminal justice information.  A few state
legislatures have recently passed laws requiring the gathering of data about
criminal investigations, prosecutions, and adjudications.146  Nonprofit orga-
nizations have also begun compiling criminal justice data in a more central-
ized and accessible format.147  This trend reflects a growing understanding
that improved data collection can enhance public safety, encourage more
efficient criminal case processing, and address injustices in the system.148
Because the great majority of criminal cases are resolved through guilty
pleas, the lack of data about plea bargaining frustrates efforts toward evi-
dence-based criminal justice reform.  Some of the plea-related data (about
charges filed, charge amendments, and case dispositions) may be available,
but are not easily accessible by the public149 and are often isolated from
other case information, making them difficult to analyze.150  Other plea-
related information, such as the terms and timing of a plea offer, is not sys-
tematically recorded.151  Even when it is, the records are not public and are
often spread across multiple sources, from prosecutors’ files to emails and
texts, and are therefore difficult to gather and study.152  Better documenta-
making); Sarah Lustbader, Spotlight: ‘A New Wave of Prosecutorial Transparency,’ THE APPEAL
(June 7, 2019), https://theappeal.org/spotlight-a-new-wave-of-prosecutorial-transparency.
But cf. FORTIER, supra note 25, at 10–11 (noting that “[w]hile some prosecutors have volun-
tarily made greater transparency a priority, others have worked against such reform” and
giving examples).
144 See Jason Tashea, Liberating Criminal Justice Data: How a Florida Law Provides a
Blueprint for the Nation, A.B.A. J. (June 18, 2019), https://www.abajournal.com/web/arti-
cle/liberating-criminal-justice-data-how-a-florida-law-offers-a-blueprint-for-the-nation
(“Going into effect statewide Jan. 1, 2020, new data will be collected across courts, correc-
tions, police, prosecutors and public defenders.  While not retroactively affecting historic
data, the new dataset will include charges and case outcomes, [including plea deals,] and
any alternative programs used in lieu of trial, conviction or incarceration.”); see also An Act
Increasing Fairness and Transparency in the Criminal Justice System, G.B. 880, 2019 Gen.
Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27A.420 (West 2020) (requiring a
record, for purposes of maintaining statistics, of the sentencing and charging concessions
made in exchange for a guilty plea).
145 See generally, e.g., RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE
OF MASS INCARCERATION 2 (2019); Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institu-
tional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049 (2016); Jason Kreag, Prosecutorial
Analytics, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 771 (2017); Metzger & Ferguson, supra note 119; Wiseman,
supra note 114.
146 See supra note 144.
147 See MEASURES FOR JUST., supra note 142.
148 See Amy Bach, Missing: Criminal Justice Data, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/opinion/missing-criminal-justice-data.html.
149 Id.; Crespo, supra note 145, at 2053; Wiseman, supra note 114, at 372–84.
150 E.g., Wiseman, supra note 114, at 372–84, and accompanying text.
151 See supra Part I.
152 Scholars have commented on the difficulty of gaining access to information related
to plea bargaining. See, e.g., Besiki L. Kutateladze, Victoria Z. Lawson & Nancy R. Andiloro,
Does Evidence Really Matter?  An Exploratory Analysis of the Role of Evidence in Plea Bargaining in
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tion and access to organized and searchable plea data are therefore necessary
to allow meaningful analysis and discussion of areas of the criminal justice
system that “might well merit reform.”153
V. TRANSPARENCY PROPOSALS
While certain aspects of plea bargaining may need to remain confiden-
tial in order to protect candor in the negotiations, to shield cooperators, and
to conserve resources, broader transparency in plea bargaining promises to
make the process fairer, more truthful, and more legitimate.  Enhancing
transparency in plea bargaining would also be consistent with our constitu-
tional commitment to open criminal proceedings.  This Part addresses sev-
eral concrete ways in which transparency can be enhanced without unduly
burdening the criminal justice system or harming reasonable interests in
confidentiality.
A. The Multiple Dimensions of Transparency
Transparency is not an all-or-nothing proposition.  Rather, it can vary in
degree along several dimensions.154  Lawmakers and courts can consider
these various dimensions as they decide which types of transparency best bal-
ance the competing values and interests at stake.155
The first relevant dimension concerns timing—the question of when
transparency is provided.  For example, transparency may be provided in real
time, as soon as decisions are made, or it may be provided later, in a digital or
paper record summarizing the process or the outcome.156  In the plea-bar-
gaining context, an example of real-time transparency is when the public is
permitted to attend plea hearings or plea negotiations happening in open
court.157  By contrast, retrospective transparency occurs when records of plea
offers or agreements are made available to others to review after the negotia-
Felony Drug Cases, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 431, 431 (2015) (“Unfortunately, these negoti-
ated processes are not formally recorded in court records, and even when they are,
researchers seldom are granted access to them.”).
153 Bach, supra note 148.
154 Andrew Keane Woods, The Transparency Tax, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6–9 (2018).
155 The literature on costs and benefits of transparency is vast and spans diverse legal
and policy areas.  For a sampling, see generally TRANSPARENCY: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERN-
ANCE? 25, 32 (Christopher Hood & David Heald eds., 2006); TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY:
THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION (David E. Pozen & Michael Schud-
son eds., 2018); Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Visible Policing: Technology, Transparency, and Demo-
cratic Control, 109 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3552240); Nathan Cortez, Regulation by Database, 89 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1 (2018); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885 (2006);
Woods, supra note 154.
156 Bloch-Wehba, supra note 155 (manuscript at 22–23); David Heald, Varieties of Trans-
parency, in TRANSPARENCY: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNANCE?, supra note 155, at 25, 32.
157 See supra note 72 and accompanying text (noting that rights of public access extend
to plea hearings); infra note 285 and accompanying text (discussing state rules requiring
judicial participation in negotiations to occur on the record).
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tions are over.  In some cases, transparency can be delayed for a longer
period—for example, to address concerns about the safety of cooperating
defendants.158
The second dimension of transparency concerns its subject—trans-
parency about what.159  Does the audience get to see the content of the
entire process, or does it only see the outcome, or part of the outcome?  For
example, publicizing a plea agreement or the resulting sentence uncovers
merely the end point of negotiations.160  Disclosing plea offers provides a
glimpse into the steps leading up to the final agreement.161  Opening up the
negotiations themselves to outside scrutiny provides the most transparency,
but at a higher cost to efficiency and effectiveness.162
Another dimension of transparency that policymakers must consider
relates to the level at which disclosure is provided.  Transparency could be
provided on an individual basis, documenting and making available the
details of each case, or it could occur on an aggregate basis, where data are
anonymized and provided in bulk.  Providing aggregate data about plea-bar-
gaining inputs and outputs facilitates analysis of trends and precedents in
plea bargaining, while preserving the privacy of the individuals involved in
cases.  On the other hand, disclosing individual case information helps inter-
ested parties to ensure that aggregation is done properly and that justice is
being done in each case.  Because transparency in individual cases is more
likely to threaten the privacy and safety of the defendant, victims, and third
parties, however, it needs to be handled more carefully, with redactions of
sensitive information and limitations on who can access detailed case-level
data.163
Another choice that drafters of transparency rules must make is whether
to require that the reasons for a particular decision be made transparent—
158 See infra notes 188–89 and accompanying text; cf. Woods, supra note 154, at 56
(giving examples of different areas of the law where “[r]ather than face an absolute choice
between total transparency and total secrecy, regulators instead choose to keep a policy
secret for a limited period of time”).
159 Bloch-Wehba, supra note 155 (manuscript at 18–20); Woods, supra note 154, at
18–19.
160 See infra Section V.B.
161 See infra Sections V.C–D.
162 Heald, supra note 156, at 31 (“Transparency of process may sometimes be damaging
to efficiency and effectiveness, because it directly consumes resources and . . . induces
defensive behavior in the face of what is perceived as oppressive surveillance.”).  If plea
negotiations were to be public, participants would likely be less candid and less flexible in
their positions; furthermore, special measures would need to be taken to protect sensitive
information from disclosure. See supra Part III.
163 Public records laws have developed sophisticated approaches to balancing the inter-
ests in government transparency and individual privacy and can provide guidance in this
area. See Long v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 692 F.3d 185, 192 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Peter A.
Winn, Judicial Information Management in an Electronic Age: Old Standards, New Challenges, 3
FED. CTS. L. REV. 135, 141–71 (2009) (identifying techniques through which courts can
protect sensitive information while maintaining transparency in court records).
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transparency about the why.164  A transparency policy at one end of the spec-
trum might demand that prosecutors explain why they reduce or dismiss
charges or recommend a particular sentence.165  A less demanding policy
may simply ask the prosecutor to check off boxes listing different possible
reasons for charge reductions and plea offers.166  And on the other end of
the spectrum, prosecutors may not need to provide any justification for the
plea offers they make, as is the current practice.167
The last dimension of transparency concerns the audience to which
decisions are revealed—transparency to whom?168  Are decisions disclosed to
the entire public or to just a select group (for example, other defense attor-
neys, prosecutors, judges, and/or victims)?  Broader exposure of plea-related
decisions brings additional benefits—such as expanded oversight and
accountability for those decisions—but also additional costs.  For example,
while the disclosure of cooperation agreements to other prosecutors, defense
attorneys, or judges does not raise significant concerns about retaliation
against cooperating defendants, making the same disclosure to the public at
large does.169  The scale of transparency therefore needs to be adjusted in
some contexts to ensure that individual safety and privacy interests are ade-
quately protected.
The proposals in the subsequent Sections build on the understanding
that transparency has several dimensions and gradations, and that different
levels and types of transparency bring different costs and benefits.  This gives
flexibility to policymakers to design transparency rules in a way that fosters
openness, accountability, and public engagement with criminal justice, while
recognizing the limits that may at times be imposed on transparency in an
effort to protect candor in plea negotiations, the safety of cooperating
defendants, and the resources of the criminal justice system.
B. Requiring That Plea Agreements Be in Writing and on the Record
Perhaps the easiest and most straightforward transparency measure that
legislators across the United States can introduce is to require that plea
agreements be in writing and filed with the court.  This rule is already in
place in a number of states, and if adopted more broadly, it would enhance
the predictability, fairness, and public understanding of plea-bargaining
outcomes.
About half of the states and the federal system already demand that plea
agreements be disclosed on the record in some fashion.170  Many of these
states follow the model of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(2),
164 Woods, supra note 154, at 19.
165 See infra notes 247–51 and accompanying text.
166 See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
167 See supra note 33.
168 Bloch-Wehba, supra note 155 (manuscript at 20–22); Woods, supra note 154, at
20–22.
169 See supra Section III.C.
170 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 31 21-JAN-21 9:50
2021] transparency  in  plea  bargaining 1003
which provides that plea agreements must be disclosed “in open court” or,
on showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered.171
While Rule 11(c)(2) does not expressly require that plea agreements be in
writing or be filed with the court, in practice, this is the norm in federal
court.172
Yet in some states with equivalent rules, the parties regularly enter into
verbal agreements and simply disclose them to the court at the plea hear-
ing.173  This introduces the risk that terms of the oral agreement would be
forgotten or misinterpreted by the parties and would lead to disputes when
the agreement is presented to the court.174  Furthermore, members of the
public interested in learning about the terms of the bargain must either be
present at the hearing or request (and pay for) a transcript after the fact.
Given the logistical difficulties of attending numerous plea hearings or gath-
ering multiple transcripts for comparison of plea terms, this type of trans-
parency is of limited use for those wishing to monitor plea agreements more
systematically.
A more promising model rule is therefore one that further requires that
the plea agreement be reduced to writing.  An example is Arizona Rule of
Criminal Procedure 17.4(b), which provides that “[t]he terms of a plea
agreement must be in writing and be signed by the defendant, defense coun-
sel (if any), and the prosecutor” and that “[t]he parties must file the agree-
ment with the court.”175  Criminal procedure rules in Indiana and New
Mexico likewise specify that plea agreements must be in writing and filed
with the court.176
Adopting a rule that requires plea agreements to be in writing and on
the record would yield several important benefits.  First, it would offer
greater predictability to the parties and reduce disputes about the terms of
the agreement.177  Second, it would allow the public to better monitor plea
171 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(2).
172 See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text; see also Cooperation and Plea Agreements,
supra note 104, at 90 (“[T]here is no rule . . . in the federal criminal context that requires
the filing of a plea agreement . . . .  It has been a practice in many districts around the
country, but it is just that.  It has been a practice.” (statement of Judge K. Michael Moore)).
173 See State v. Padilla, No. 98187, 2012 WL 6515118, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 13,
2012) (“A written plea offer and agreement can greatly limit problems, like here, where an
oral offer is made and then is subsequently rescinded on the morning that the plea is to be
taken in open court.”); Ex parte Cassady, 486 So. 2d 453, 456 (Ala. 1986); see also Jenia I.
Turner, Lecture at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law Criminal Justice Forum & Con-
stitution Day Lecture: Should Plea Bargaining Be More Transparent? (Sept. 19, 2019).
174 See Cassady, 486 So. 2d at 456.
175 ARIZ. R. CRIM P. 17.4(b).
176 IND. CODE § 35-35-3-3(a) (2017) (“No plea agreement may be made by the prosecut-
ing attorney to a court on a felony charge except: (1) in writing . . . .  The plea agreement
shall be shown as filed . . . .”); N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-304(B) (“If a plea agreement has been
reached by the parties which contemplates entry of a plea of guilty or no contest it shall be
reduced to writing substantially in the form approved by the Supreme Court.  The court
shall require the disclosure of the agreement in open court . . . .”).
177 See Cassady, 486 So. 2d at 456; Padilla, 2012 WL 6515118, at *7.
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bargaining because once a plea agreement is placed on record with the
court, the public has a right of access to it.178  The mere possibility of such
monitoring would in turn encourage the parties to follow the rules and pro-
vide fair and consistent treatment to defendants.  By making the records of
plea agreements publicly accessible (particularly if they are also electronic
and searchable), the rule would also facilitate empirical analysis of plea bar-
gaining and thus more informed discussion about areas that merit reform.179
Requiring that plea agreements be in writing and placed on the record
is not likely to impose significant costs.  Plea agreements have long been
placed in writing and made part of the record in federal court and in states
like Arizona, Indiana, and New Mexico.  There is no evidence to suggest that
this has overwhelmed courts or prosecutors in these states or that it has
impeded plea negotiations.180  With the advent of technology, including case
management systems that help auto-populate standard plea agreement
forms, any burden in reducing an oral plea agreement to writing is likely to
be minimal.181
Placing plea agreements on the record can have one significant cost: it
can increase the risk of harm to cooperating defendants.  When the defen-
dant’s cooperation is recorded in a plea agreement, which is then publicly
disclosed on an electronic platform, criminal rivals or associates of the defen-
dant can use information about the defendant’s cooperation to threaten or
harm him.  Courts must therefore take additional precautions to address this
concern.
Courts have traditionally sealed plea agreements where the prosecutor
shows that disclosure poses a risk of physical harm to the cooperator or his
family.182  Because the sealing itself can signal that the defendant has cooper-
ated, however, some judges have more recently experimented with a more
radical approach.  In 2016, the federal Committee on Court Administration
and Case Management recommended a blanket policy under which all plea
agreements would include a sealed supplement, and that supplement would
indicate whether the defendant cooperated with the government or not.183
Several courts have followed this recommendation.184
178 See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
179 To permit such analysis, plea-agreement data must be integrated with charging and
sentencing information in each case. See generally Crespo, supra note 145; Schneider &
Alkon, supra note 4.
180 Jury and bench trial rates in these three states were one to three percent of total
criminal dispositions in 2016, consistent with rates in most other states. See CT. STAT. PRO-
JECT, supra note 1.
181 See, e.g., Electronic Docket: Setting Control Lets You Manage Your Dockets, PROSECUTOR BY
KARPEL, http://www.prosecutorbykarpel.com/features/electronic-docket/ (last visited
Nov. 3, 2020) [hereinafter KARPEL, Electronic Docket].  The system also permits the prosecu-
tion to easily share the written plea agreement with the defense. Id.
182 See, e.g., Wash. Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
183 Interim Guidance for Cooperator Information, supra note 13, at 245.
184 See id.
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Sealing of plea agreements does not mean complete lack of trans-
parency.  Even when plea agreements—or their supplement—are sealed and
inaccessible to the public, they are available to prosecutors, defense attor-
neys, and judges, providing a measure of internal transparency.
Yet the blanket sealing of plea agreement supplements raises concerns
as it conceals a high number of judicial records that are presumed to be open
to the public under constitutional law.  Such categorical sealing policies rest
on shaky constitutional grounds.  As a memo to the Advisory Committee on
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure explained, “the Supreme Court and
circuit courts have to date rejected categorical, across-the-board closure poli-
cies and required case-by-case justifications.”185
Courts have generally disfavored categorical sealing practices because
they risk diminishing fairness and public confidence in the criminal process.
The process by which prosecutors solicit and reward cooperation by defend-
ants is opaque, inconsistent, “unregulated[,] and insulated from internal and
external review.”186  If the ultimate cooperation agreements are also system-
atically hidden from the public, one of the few existing checks on the process
would disappear.  And, as Federal District Judge Brock Hornby has argued,
“if cooperation can be successfully disguised, the public will be unable to
ascertain whether a federal judge’s explanation for any sentence is forthright
and complete.  Potentially all federal sentences and their rationales will seem
veiled.”187
Given the high costs of blanket sealing policies to the fairness and legiti-
macy of the criminal process, it is important to consider more targeted
approaches to the problem of harm to cooperating defendants.  For exam-
ple, supplements to plea agreements may be presumptively sealed for only a
limited time, becoming public records after a set period (e.g., five years),
unless the prosecutor shows a continuing risk to the defendant.  Such a
scheme would be similar to the deferral of declassification of sensitive
national security information, where the information becomes accessible to
the public only after a fixed period of time.188  Temporary sealing would also
be consistent with constitutional law on public access by ensuring that sealing
is no broader than necessary to protect legitimate government interests.189
Another way in which jurisdictions could narrow and focus sealing prac-
tices is by using sealed supplements only for certain types of cases where
retaliation is likely to occur, such as cases involving drug trafficking or organ-
185 Beale & King Memorandum, supra note 71, at 226.
186 Jessica A. Roth, Informant Witnesses and the Risk of Wrongful Convictions, 53 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 737, 756 (2016).
187 Hornby, supra note 103, at 47.
188 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.5, 3 C.F.R. 298 (2010) (setting out the duration
of national security classifications).
189 ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, FED. JUD. CTR., SEALING COURT RECORDS AND PROCEED-
INGS: A POCKET GUIDE 21–22 (2010).
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ized crime.190  In other cases, courts can continue to use a case-by-case
approach to sealing.
In brief, courts have a range of techniques at their disposal to deal with
the risk of harm to cooperators when plea agreements are placed on the
record.  Given the range of benefits that result from the writing and record-
ing of plea agreements—increasing predictability, promoting fairness, and
strengthening public confidence in the process—states across the country
should mandate such recording.
C. Placing Plea Offers on the Record
Another way in which plea-bargaining transparency can be enhanced is
to require that, before proceeding to trial, prosecutors set on the record any
plea offer that they extended and the defendant rejected.  The defendant
would hear the offer in open court and have the opportunity to raise ques-
tions and concerns before deciding whether to proceed with trial.  This
requirement would help ensure that the defendant has been informed of the
plea offer, a basic element of receiving effective assistance.191
Placing the offer on the record would also trigger rights of public access,
allowing the public to scrutinize the plea-bargaining process more effec-
tively.192  This would be consistent with our constitutional commitment to
public criminal proceedings and facilitate more informed criminal justice
policy.  In particular, it would permit the public to understand the true size
of the trial penalty because the case record would reflect both the plea offer
made and the disposition after trial.193  The public could then discuss and
determine whether and how much defendants should be penalized for
rejecting a plea offer and choosing to exercise their right to trial.
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizes the benefits of record-
ing plea offers.  In Missouri v. Frye,194 the Supreme Court held that criminal
defendants have a right to competent counsel during plea bargaining and
that, “as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal
offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that
may be favorable to the accused.”195  The Court established remedies for
defendants whose rights to competent representation in plea negotiations
190 The data show that cooperation is most common in white-collar crime cases and
drug trafficking cases.  Roth, supra note 186, at 750 (“[T]hose charged with drug traffick-
ing and fraud accounted for the largest number of [sentencing reductions for coopera-
tion] in the aggregate, representing approximately 74% of all downward departures for
cooperation.”).  Because white-collar crime cases rarely feature threats to cooperating
defendants, however, one could limit blanket sealing policies to drug trafficking and
organized crime cases.
191 See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012).
192 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
193 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
194 566 U.S. 134 (2012).
195 Id. at 145.
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are violated,196 and it recommended certain measures to prevent such viola-
tions.  The Court encouraged prosecutors to memorialize plea offers and
place them on the record in order to reduce the risk that a defense attorney
may fail to convey a plea offer.197  Such measures would “help ensure against
late, frivolous, or fabricated claims” of ineffective assistance and improve
defense representation at the plea negotiation stage:
First, the fact of a formal offer means that its terms and its processing can be
documented so that what took place in the negotiation process becomes
more clear if some later inquiry turns on the conduct of earlier pretrial
negotiations.  Second, States may elect to follow rules that all offers must be
in writing, again to ensure against later misunderstandings or fabricated
charges.  Third, formal offers can be made part of the record at any subse-
quent plea proceeding or before a trial on the merits, all to ensure that a
defendant has been fully advised before those further proceedings
commence.198
Some commentators have expressed concerns that memorializing plea
offers and placing them on the record before the case proceeds to trial
would be too burdensome.199  Yet existing practice suggests that that it is
feasible.  Even before Frye, a few jurisdictions had begun encouraging or
requiring the parties to document plea offers.200  After Frye, many more fol-
lowed suit: prosecutors in federal and state courts across the country began
filing motions asking courts to conduct hearings before trial so as to ensure
that defendants were aware of plea offers made by the prosecution.201  Some
courts began conducting such hearings on their own initiative.202  As an Illi-
nois appeals court recommended, “trial courts [should] make a record of
196 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170–71 (2012).
197 Frye, 566 U.S. at 146.
198 Id. (citation omitted).
199 See, e.g., In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 756 n.7 (Cal. 1992); Polando, supra note 110,
at 66.
200 See N.J. CT. R. 3:9-1; In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d at 756 n.7.
201 See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 294 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1222, 1226 (D.N.M. 2018)
(mem.) (granting prosecution’s motion to conduct a “Frye hearing” to place plea offer on
the record and noting practice of “district courts across the country” to conduct such hear-
ings); Stevens v. United States, No. 2:15cv28, 2015 WL 4361560, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 13,
2015); People v. Grimes, 378 P.3d 320, 346 (Cal. 2016); see also The Supreme Court’s Decisions
in Lafler and Frye, WARRINER L., http://www.warrinerlaw.com/articles/the-consequences-
of-the-supreme-courts-decisions-in-lafler-and-frye-ineffective-assistance-of-counsel-in-plea-
negotiation/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
202 See United States v. Hopkins, No. 14-CV-0596, 2015 WL 3772622, at *16–17 (N.D.
Okla. June 17, 2015); United States v. Slane, No. 14-938, 2015 WL 728481, at *20 (W.D.
Pa. Feb. 19, 2015); State v. Easterling, 139 N.E.3d 497, 505–506 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2019); What Is a Lafler Frye Hearing in Georgia?, LAWSON & BERRY, https://
www.georgiacriminallawyer.com/what-is-a-lafler-frye-hearing-in-georgia (last visited Nov. 3,
2020) (“The purpose of [a Lafler/Frye] hearing is for the court to inquire whether a plea
offer has been made, whether the plea offer has been communicated to the client, and
what the plea offer is.  This is typically done on the record which means that a transcript
will be done for the hearing and parties can look through the transcript later on.”).
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plea negotiations ‘at a pretrial hearing so that if problems arise, corrective
action can be taken prior to the scheduled trial.’”203  Such a record, the
court explained, would help guard against “reversal of a judgment for an
otherwise error-free trial” and “allow for efficient adjudication of postconvic-
tion proceedings.”204
These so-called Frye hearings take somewhat different forms depending
on the jurisdiction and its openness to judicial involvement in plea negotia-
tions.  But they generally focus on the following questions: (1) “[w]hether
the Government has made any formal plea agreement offer(s) to the
defense”; (2) “[w]hether the defense attorney has communicated the plea
agreement offer(s) and explained it to the defendant”; and (3) “[i]f there
was an offer, whether the defendant rejected it.”205
The growing number of jurisdictions in which offers are placed on the
record and Frye hearings are conducted shows that this type of procedure is
not unduly lengthy or burdensome.  As two practitioner authors commented,
“[t]his type of allocution could be accomplished in under 10 minutes on the
eve of jury selection.”206  Not only are they not lengthy, but they are seen by
many courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys as an efficient and advisable
measure to reduce the incidence of ineffective assistance of counsel.207
Another potential critique of the practice is that it may encourage
improper judicial participation in plea negotiations.208  Indeed, courts must
take some precautions to address this concern.  What shape the precautions
take depends largely on the jurisdiction’s approach to judicial participation
in plea negotiations.  If a jurisdiction prohibits participation altogether,
judges must be careful not to make any comment on the merits of the plea
offer or inquire into the reasons for it.209  For example, when the offer is
placed on the record, the judge may not compare the outcomes of pleading
guilty to those of going to trial and may not “offer[ ] guidance about
favorable plea agreement terms.”210
203 People v. Morgan, No. 2-17-0988, 2019 WL 962804, at *8 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 14, 2019)
(Birkett, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Williams, 54 N.E.3d 934, 942 (Ill. App. Ct.
2016)).
204 Id. (quoting Williams, 54 N.E.3d at 942).
205 Slane, 2015 WL 728481, at *20 n.14 (citing United States v. Kubini, Crim. No. 11-14,
2017 WL 2573872, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2014) (mem.)); see also United States v. Dodge,
No. 1:16-CR-1697, 2018 WL 3352965, at *2 (D.N.M. July 9, 2018).
206 See, e.g., Maranda E. Fritz & Gabrielle Y. Vazquez, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea
Negotiations After Lafler, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.law.com/newyor-
klawjournal/almID/1202670910273/effective-assistance-of-counsel-in-plea-negotiations-
after-lafler/?slreturn=20201105094444.
207 See supra notes 201–06 and accompanying text; Goode, supra note 23.
208 See United States v. Broombaugh, No. 14-40005-10, 2014 WL 3107963, at *4 (D. Kan.
July 8, 2014).
209 See Slane, 2015 WL 728481, at *20 n.14.
210 United States v. Morgan, 294 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1223 (D.N.M. 2018); see also Black v.
State, No. 63880, 2014 WL 1424587, at *2 (Nev. Apr. 10, 2014) (“[J]udge’s statement that
he is ‘the toughest sentencer in the building,’ his opinion that the State would now have a
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Placing the offer on the record is easier in jurisdictions where judicial
participation in the negotiations is allowed.211  But even in those jurisdic-
tions, courts must ensure that judicial involvement does not coerce a defen-
dant into pleading guilty or otherwise compromise the court’s
impartiality.212  Because any statements that judges make in this context
would be on the record, appellate courts can review the remarks closely for
evidence of threats or other pressures placed on the defendant.213
As long as courts take these precautions (as many already do), placing a
plea offer on the record should not raise concerns about judicial impartiality
or coercion.  Judges must also refrain from asking any details about the dis-
cussions between counsel and the defendant concerning the offer so as not
to interfere with the attorney-client relationship.214
D. Creating Searchable Plea Databases
States and the federal system can further increase fairness in plea bar-
gaining by requiring the recording of plea offers in digital databases that are
searchable and accessible to prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges.
The digital plea records should include, at a minimum, the date of the
offer, the terms of the offer, and the date on which it expires.215  This infor-
mation would be entered into a digital file that also contains charging infor-
mation, other relevant information about the case (such as the defendant’s
prior record and detention status), and the final disposition of the case.  The
data would be shared between prosecutors and defense attorneys and would
later be accessible by judges.
The infrastructure for such databases is already available, and versions of
them are being used by prosecutors across the country to manage cases, store
digital evidence, and share information with the defense.216  These case man-
less difficult time proving the charges against Black, and his suggestion that Black consider
taking an Alford plea were not required under Frye and were arguably coercive.”).
211 See Turner, supra note 21, at 238 & n.223.
212 See, e.g., Foth v. State, No. 03-18-00085, 2019 WL 1474674, at *5 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Apr.
4, 2019); State v. McNeir, No. 105417, 2018 WL 386618, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 11,
2018).
213 See Turner, supra note 21, at 262–64.
214 See United States v. Pirk, 236 F. Supp. 3d 796, 801 (W.D.N.Y. 2017); Slane, 2015 WL
728481, at *20 n.14; Ellen Podgor, DOJ’s Lafler/Frye Motion Goes Too Far, WHITE COLLAR
CRIME PROF BLOG (Apr. 4, 2012), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollar-
crime_blog/2012/04/dojs-laflerfrye-motion-goes-too-far.html (noting that judges should
not ask defense attorneys how they advised their clients to respond to a plea offer).
215 See ROLLINS MEMO, supra note 143, at 37 (establishing guidelines for prosecutors in
Suffolk County to follow in memorializing plea offers).
216 See, e.g., Criminal Case Management: Designed by Prosecutors for Prosecutors, PROSECUTOR
BY KARPEL [hereinafter KARPEL, Criminal Case Management], http://www.prosecutorby
karpel.com/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2020); eProsecutor, J. TECHS., http://journaltech.com/
eprosecutor/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2020); Integrated Criminal Justice Solutions, TECHSHARE
[hereinafter TECHSHARE], https://techsharetx.gov/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2020); Odyssey
Attorney Manager, TYLER TECHS., https://www.tylertech.com/products/odyssey/attorney-
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agement platforms allow prosecutors to enter a plea offer into a digital file
and, with just the click of a button, convey the offer to the defense.217  The
software can also generate plea agreements by auto-populating the template
with the correct case information.218  Defense attorneys get an email notifica-
tion whenever an offer is entered or a file (such as an item of evidence or a
draft plea agreement) is uploaded for their review.219  Alerts by the system
can also help prosecutors remember to send timely notifications about steps
in the case to defense attorneys, victims, or others involved in the manage-
ment of the case.220
The digital platforms keep records of the entries made and can generate
data that permit analysis of plea-bargaining decisions and trends.221  While
they are currently not searchable, the platforms can be configured to allow
users to consult past plea offers that fit specified criteria.222  This would per-
mit prosecutors, defense attorneys, or judges to compare an offer to plea
precedents.  Because records of plea offers are digitally preserved, at some
point, anonymized data could also be analyzed as part of internal audits of
prosecutorial decisions.
The creation of searchable plea databases would have several important
benefits.  First, it would reduce the time and effort that prosecutors expend
to keep track of cases.  As one software maker advertises,
As a prosecutor, you need to focus your razor-like wit to winning cases—not
keeping track of files, court dates, and other administrative tasks. . . .  Our
manager (last visited Nov. 3, 2020); see also OLSEN ET AL., supra note 36, at 10 (“Almost all
offices report having at least one electronic case management system, except among the
small offices, where 32 percent report they do not have one.”).
217 For example, TechShare.Prosecutor allows the prosecutor to enter a plea offer into
the system and share it as a document on a mirror TechShare defense attorney portal.  The
defense attorney receives an email whenever a new document is shared. See TECHSHARE,
supra note 216.  A conversation with a Karpel sales agent on June 28, 2019, confirmed that
the Karpel software allows entry of plea information and the sharing of this information
with the defense.  Prosecutors using Odyssey can generate plea agreements and share this
information with public defenders via the Odyssey Portal, which allows attorneys to access
this information any time of day online, including on mobile platforms. TYLER TECHS.,
ODYSSEY CASE MANAGER: THE MOST COMPLETE COURT SYSTEM AVAILABLE 11, 13 (2017)
[hereinafter ODYSSEY CASE MANAGER], https://www.tylertech.com/DesktopModules/
EasyDNNNews/DocumentDownload.ashx?portalid=0&moduleid=13937&articleid=504&
documentid=46.
218 See KARPEL, Electronic Docket, supra note 181. The case management interface stores
plea offers and generates documents that can be quickly shared by email. See KARPEL,
Criminal Case Management, supra note 216.
219 See supra note 217.
220 See, e.g., Case Management Software for Prosecutors, ABACUSNEXT [hereinafter ABACUS-
NEXT], https://www.amicusattorney.com/solutions/prosecutor-case-management-soft
ware/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
221 See ODYSSEY CASE MANAGER, supra note 217, at 26; see also Reporting: Real Time Report-
ing, PROSECUTOR BY KARPEL, http://www.prosecutorbykarpel.com/features/reporting/
(last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
222 Cf. Crespo, supra note 145, at 2070.
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prosecutor case management software stays at the office while you’re out
doing what you do best—enforcing the law and bringing criminals to
justice.223
Another company boasts that a customer who “used to take . . . 4–6 hours to
update cases after a large docket . . . now only takes 20–30 minutes.”224
Others also highlight testimonies by prosecutors about the efficiencies that
their systems create; for example, TechShare quotes a Texas prosecutor as
saying that her office “can now process Misdemeanor Dockets in less than
two minutes per case by generating the required plea and judgment
paperwork in TechShare.Prosecutor system directly in the courtroom.”225
In addition to saving prosecutors time, the software would permit chief
prosecutors to review the operations of the office more effectively, ensuring
that “nothing falls through the cracks”226 and that line prosecutors are fol-
lowing office guidelines and policies.  If disparities are found, supervisors can
adjust office policies to address the problem.227  Because of these benefits of
systematic documentation, some chief prosecutors required the documenta-
tion of charging and plea decisions even before digital filing systems were
available.228  With the advent of modern technology, more head prosecutors
are interested in “data-based” prosecutions and would welcome the insights
into office operations that plea databases can provide.229
Another benefit of the systematic recording of plea offers into databases
is that it can reduce disputes between the parties about the existence or
terms of the offers.  In jurisdictions without routine recording practices,
defense attorneys can lose offers when one prosecutor leaves a case (for
example, because the prosecutor rotates to a different courtroom or has a
scheduling conflict) and the next prosecutor who takes the case fails to
honor the initial plea offer because it was not documented.230  Even when
the same prosecutor handles a case throughout, the parties may forget or
misinterpret the terms of offers that have not been reduced to writing.  Regu-
lar plea offer documentation can minimize such misunderstandings and
disputes.
223 ABACUSNEXT, supra note 220.
224 KARPEL, Electronic Docket, supra note 181.
225 Melissa Hicks, TechShare.Prosecutor: Team Attends 2014 Elected Prosecutors Conference
Hosted by TDCCA, TEX. CONF. OF URB. CNTYS. (Feb. 11, 2015), https://cuc.org/blog/2015/
02/11/techshare-prosecutor-team-attends-2014-elected-prosecutors-conference-hosted-by-
tdcaa/ (quoting Laura Nodolf, District Attorney, Midland County, Texas).
226 ABACUSNEXT, supra note 220.
227 See, e.g., WAYNE MCKENZIE, DON STEMEN, DEREK COURSEN & ELIZABETH FARID, PROSE-
CUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE: USING DATA TO ADVANCE FAIRNESS IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
6–7 (2009) (noting that prosecutors in Wisconsin adjusted their charging policies in
response to finding racial disparities in certain types of drug prosecutions).
228 See, e.g., Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 134
(2008).
229 See supra note 143.
230 See, e.g., Interview with Kevin Fisher, Criminal Defense Attorney, in Atlanta, Ga.
(July 8, 2019).
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Digital recording of offers can also improve prosecutors’ compliance
with victim consultation laws and policies.  In many jurisdictions, prosecutors
are required to notify victims of offers made and upcoming plea hearings.231
Indeed, the number of states requiring such notifications is growing.232
Even when notification is not expressly required, it can help bolster the legiti-
macy of the process in the eyes of the victims and the public.233  Yet past
practice suggests that victim notification laws are often poorly imple-
mented.234  Digital plea records—and the scheduled reminders they can
generate—can help address this problem.  A digital recording that automati-
cally reminds the prosecutor to send a notification to the victim—and gener-
ates a standard notification message—could help prevent delays and
omissions that leave victims with no opportunity to object to the plea deal.235
Plea databases can also promote fairness in plea bargaining by enabling
participants to assess how a plea offer in one case measures against prior
offers in similar cases.236  Prosecutors could consult the database to ensure
they are providing consistent treatment of defendants.  Defense attorneys
could likewise compare plea precedents and assess the reasonableness of
offers they are receiving.  This would allow them to be more informed and
effective advocates for their clients.237
Consider a recent headline-grabbing criminal defense tactic that shows
the potential of plea databases to promote effective representation and equal
treatment of defendants.  In July 2019, billionaire Henry Nicholas negotiated
an unusually favorable plea deal on charges of drug possession and drug traf-
ficking in Las Vegas.238  He was to serve no jail time, but would instead “go
231 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
232 Id.
233 See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 135, at 237–38; Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and
Victims: From Consultation to Guidelines, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 323, 328 (2007).
234 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
235 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 136, at 34 (finding that a major
reason for delay in notifying victims involves the time it takes to collect mailing addresses,
write, and post letters).
236 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463,
2532 (2004) (“A database of past trial and plea-bargain outcomes would give lawyers access
to information that some repeat players already know . . . .  Plea bargains, however, are
often complex, multidimensional agreements in which the parties need to know the defen-
dant’s criminal history and the strength of the evidence as well as the likely sentence.
While a database could not capture these facts fully, it could at least provide a starting
point or relevant anchor for researching, comparing prices, and bargaining.” (footnote
omitted)).
237 See Schneider & Alkon, supra note 4, at 452–54.
238 California Billionaire, Friend Spared Prison Time in Las Vegas Drug Case After Taking Plea




%20guilt; Riley Snyder, Public Defenders to Use Generous Plea Deal Offered to Billionaire Henry
Nicholas as Model for Future Plea Deal Requests, NEV. INDEP. (Aug. 15, 2019), https://then
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 41 21-JAN-21 9:50
2021] transparency  in  plea  bargaining 1013
on informal probation, perform 250 hours of community service, attend reg-
ular drug counseling sessions and . . . make a $500,000 contribution to drug
counseling programs in Clark County,” a sum representing a mere 0.0128%
of his net worth.239  Seizing on the news of the deal, public defenders in
Vegas began demanding similar bargains for their indigent clients, noting
that “[b]illionaire Defendant Nicholas and Defendant XXX are similarly situ-
ated and should be similarly treated by the prosecution and the courts.”240
The unusual publicity of the plea bargain in the Nicholas case, made possible
by the defendant’s near-celebrity status, permitted public defenders to make
the comparison between him and their clients and insist on equal treatment.
A database would allow defense attorneys to research and compare plea
offers in all cases, not only those that make the headlines.  In turn, this would
promote more effective defense representation and more evenhanded treat-
ment of defendants by courts.
As the next Section elaborates, plea databases can also strengthen moni-
toring of the plea process by judges.241  Like prosecutors and defense attor-
neys, judges could consult the database to evaluate how an offer compares to
precedent and determine whether to accept any sentencing recommenda-
tions that accompany the offer.  Judges may also be able to consult the
database to determine whether prosecutors used potentially coercive tactics
(e.g., whether they reduced charges or sentencing recommendations drasti-
cally, without any change in the evidence available; or made an “exploding”
offer with an unusually short timeframe for acceptance; or linked an offer to
the guilty plea of the defendant’s relative).242  Such information might
prompt the judge to probe more deeply into the voluntariness of the guilty
plea.  Even if judges only rarely engage in such oversight during their review
of the guilty plea, the possibility of judicial scrutiny would incentivize prose-
cutors to refrain from improper negotiating tactics in the first place.
The entry of a plea offer into the digital system would not trigger public
access under the common law or the Constitution; if a plea offer has not
been filed with the court, it does not generally become a judicial record sim-
ply by being entered into a database that the court can consult.243  Even in
the few jurisdictions where, under state common law, a plea offer’s entry into
evadaindependent.com/article/public-defenders-to-use-generous-plea-deal-offered-to-bil-
lionaire-henry-nicholas-as-model-for-future-plea-deal-requests.
239 Snyder, supra note 238.
240 Id.; see also David Ferrara, Lawyers Want Billionaire Treatment for Las Vegas Man in Drug
Case, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.reviewjournal.com/crime/courts/
lawyers-want-billionaire-treatment-for-las-vegas-man-in-drug-case-1832689/.
241 See infra Section V.E.
242 For a discussion of coercive prosecutorial tactics in plea bargaining, see generally
Cynthia Alkon, Hard Bargaining in Plea Bargaining: When Do Prosecutors Cross the Line?, 17
NEV. L.J. 401 (2017); Clark Neily, Jury Empowerment as an Antidote to Coercive Plea Bargaining,
31 FED. SENT’G REP. 284 (2019).
243 United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Ex parte Birmingham
News Co., 624 So. 2d 1117, 1131 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993); see also Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S.
Sent’g Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that records that are “prelimi-
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a database might render the offer a public record, disclosure would be cir-
cumscribed by a balancing of interests.244  This means that, for example,
work product, information whose disclosure might interfere with the investi-
gation and prosecution of crime, and information protected under privacy
laws would not be subject to disclosure.245
If digital plea databases were adopted, researchers and journalists might
also be able to obtain some of the plea data after cases have closed, consistent
with the requirements of public information acts.  The researchers could
then analyze the data for patterns in plea bargaining.  Some might be con-
cerned that such access would compromise legitimate government or individ-
ual interests in keeping criminal case information confidential.  But public
information acts already provide for exemptions to protect such legitimate
interests.  They exempt from disclosure information concerning cooperation
by defendants, sensitive or private information, work product of prosecutors,
and any other information the disclosure of which could interfere with prose-
cutions or investigations.246
A more ambitious transparency regime may require prosecutors to
record not only the terms of plea offers in the database, but also the reasons
for those offers.247  A reason-giving requirement would encourage a more
deliberate and thoughtful approach to the process by prosecutors.  Record-
ing the reasons for offers would also allow for a more thorough and accurate
comparison of plea-bargaining inputs and outputs.
One concern with the reason-giving requirement, however, is that prose-
cutors might not be fully forthcoming in the explanations that they provide if
they know that the database is accessible by defense attorneys or judges.248
For example, prosecutors might be reluctant to acknowledge that they are
nary, advisory, or, for one reason or another, do not eventuate in any official action or
decision being taken” are not judicial records).
244 See, e.g., Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. Cnty. of Essex, 660 A.2d 1163, 1168–72 (N.J. 1995).
245 See id. at 1171–72; see also infra note 246.
246 Information that is otherwise subject to disclosure under public information acts
law may nonetheless be withheld if: (1) other law, such as privacy law or rules of procedure
and evidence, mandates confidentiality; (2) disclosure would create a risk of physical harm;
(3) the information falls within the scope of the informer’s privilege; (4) disclosure would
interfere with the investigation or prosecution of crime; (5) the information is protected as
work product. See, e.g., OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., PUBLIC INFORMATION ACT HAND-
BOOK 2018, at 61–62, 66, 71–72, 73–74, 82–84, 86 (2018); Department of Justice Guide to the
Freedom of Information Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/oip/doj-guide-free-
dom-information-act-0 (Sept. 29, 2020) (notably Exemptions 3, 6, and 7, and Exclusions
(c)(1) and (c)(2)).
247 The New Orleans DA’s Office required prosecutors to record the reasons for declin-
ing charges.  Miller & Wright, supra note 228, at 134.  Vermont rules on guilty pleas
require prosecutors in felony cases to “disclose the reasons for entry into the plea agree-
ment” on the public record during the plea colloquy. VT. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(2).
248 Cf. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV.
29, 66 (2002) (noting that because data about prosecutorial charging decisions, including
reasons for those decisions, is used only for internal administrative reasons and are not
made public, “there is little temptation to obscure important decisions in the data”).
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making a plea offer based on concerns about the credibility of a witness or
based on resource constraints.  To ensure candor, therefore, this part of the
database ought to be made accessible only internally, for purposes of audits
and supervision within the prosecutor’s office.
While defense attorneys would not have access to this part of the
database, they could create a mirror image on their end, where they would
enter the reasons they believe underlie the offers extended by the prosecu-
tion.249  Particularly within a public defender’s office or defense firms with
multiple attorneys, this database could amass valuable detail over time.250
Another concern about this feature of the database may be that it would
be too time-consuming for prosecutors or defense attorneys to write out the
reasons behind each plea offer.  To address this concern, offices can develop
a digital checklist of reasons for the plea offers, which can be easily marked
with the reasons that influenced the offer.251
Regardless of whether a database contains only the plea terms or also the
reasons for a plea offer, some may worry that such databases are too expen-
sive to create or maintain.  In light of technological advances, however, the
adoption of plea databases is increasingly feasible.  Technology has
“open[ed] up powerful new opportunities” in the administration of criminal
justice, permitting the creation of digital repositories that are easily “organiz-
able, searchable, and accessible.”252  Digital case management platforms are
already widely available and increasingly used by prosecutors’ offices, which
makes recording easy, quick, and inexpensive.253  As noted earlier, chief
prosecutors themselves are becoming more interested in collecting data
about the operation of their offices and even sharing some of it (usually in
aggregate form) with the public.254  Likewise, several states have passed legis-
lation requiring the systematic collection and analysis of criminal justice data,
including, more recently, data about charging, plea bargaining, and sentenc-
ing.255 More are likely to follow,256 showing the feasibility of the idea in light
of technological advances.
249 See Levine et al., supra note 24, at 664; Mallord, supra note 14, at 708–09, 716–17.
250 While a useful complement to prosecutor databases, public defender databases
would not be a sufficient solution to the plea-bargaining data problem.  Public defender’s
offices are not available throughout the country, and individual appointed counsel are
unlikely to have the institutional framework to create such a database; even in areas with
public defender’s offices, the databases would likely not be available to appointed or
retained defense counsel.
251 See Miller & Wright, supra note 228, at 134 (“The screening prosecutors chose their
reasons from a standardized office list and recorded their reasons in computerized format,
allowing managers to monitor each prosecutor’s work.”); see also Levine et al., supra note
24, at 664 (developing such a checklist as part of a proposal for public defender databases).
252 Crespo, supra note 145, at 2070.
253 See supra notes 216–22 and accompanying text.
254 See supra note 143.
255 See, e.g., Daniela Altimari, Lamont Applauds Final Legislative Approval of Prosecutorial
Transparency Bill, HARTFORD COURANT (June 4, 2019), https://www.courant.com/politics/
capitol-watch/hc-pol-prosecutorial-transparency-20190605-fkv7piu5ove5phw2jh4n2wwqni-
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To be sure, administrative concerns will need to be addressed as plea
databases are adopted more widely.  State or federal support may be neces-
sary for smaller, rural offices, which have fewer information technology
resources at their disposal.257  As with other governmental databases contain-
ing sensitive and private information, plea database design will also need to
prioritize data security to ensure that the information is protected from hack-
ing and misuse.258
Another concern is that better internal transparency would limit the
flexibility of line prosecutors to provide leniency in deserving cases.259  Yet
unlike binding sentencing laws, transparency would not prevent prosecutors
from offering such leniency.  If leniency is in fact appropriate, prosecutors
can still provide it and then simply justify their decision.  And even if trans-
parency diminishes somewhat the willingness of prosecutors to be merciful in
their plea offers, it will still bring substantial benefits for the criminal justice
system.  Notably, the better oversight that comes with such transparency can
help ensure that prosecutorial flexibility does not lead to problematic dispari-
ties, does not subvert the truth-seeking function of the criminal process, and
does not undermine democratically enacted criminal laws.260
E. Strengthening Judicial Review of Plea Bargains on the Record
Another way to enhance transparency in plea bargaining is to strengthen
judicial review of the plea process and ensure that such review occurs on the
story.html (noting that the Connecticut Office of Policy and Management will collect data
“relating to charges, diversionary programs, bail requests, plea deals, contact with victims,
sentencing recommendations, and demographics”); Bill Wichert, NJ Criminal Justice Data
Law Could Spur Reforms Elsewhere, LAW360 (Nov. 15, 2020), https://www.law360.com/access-
to-justice/articles/1328633/nj-criminal-justice-data-law-could-spur-reforms-elsewhere
(reporting on recent New Jersey law that requires the state’s Attorney General to gather
and analyze charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing data).
256 See Racial Disparities in Utah Prisons Need Study, Lawmaker Says, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Nov.
3, 2019), https://www.sltrib.com/news/2019/11/03/racial-disparities-utah/ (noting that
Utah state representative is “working on a prosecution transparency bill that would require
the collection of data about arrest, charging, sentencing and parole decisions to determine
how they may be contributing to racial disparities”).  Continued advocacy by nonprofit
organizations like Measures for Justice and the ACLU is likely to encourage more states to
follow suit. See generally FORTIER, supra note 25; Florida Passes Historic Legislation to Help Close
the Criminal Justice Data Gap, MEASURES FOR JUST. (Mar. 10, 2018), https://
www.measuresforjustice.org/news/2018-03-11-florida-passes-historic-legislation.
257 See Olsen et al., supra note 36, at 9; Wiseman, supra note 114, at 393, 396.
258 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-37.5-407 (2020); IND. SUP. CT., DIV. OF STATE CT. ADMIN.,
PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS HANDBOOK 7 (2010); ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS,
INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND CYBERSECURITY—ANNUAL REPORT (2018), https://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/information-systems-and-cybersecurity-annual-report-
2018; Levine et al., supra note 24, at 669; Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing
Judicial Accountability and Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307,
315, 326–27 (2004).
259 See supra Section III.B.
260 See supra Sections IV.A, V.D & V.E.
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record.  Judicial review exposes plea bargains to analysis by a more neutral
figure with the knowledge and authority to influence the outcome of the
case.  And when judicial oversight occurs on the record, it can expose critical
elements of the plea to broader scrutiny.
Judges have a constitutional duty to verify that a defendant who pleads
guilty does so voluntarily and with a sufficient understanding of the rights she
is giving up and the consequences of the guilty plea.261  Criminal procedure
rules further require judges to ascertain that guilty pleas rest on a sufficient
factual basis.262  The court’s evaluation of the guilty plea must occur on the
record, at a hearing open to the public.263
In practice, however, judges often handle the plea colloquy in a “rote
and perfunctory” manner, and as long as “the defendant parrots the correct
phrases, the judge is unlikely to scrutinize the plea any further.”264  Judges
tend to defer to the parties to tell them the facts of the case, which allows the
parties to omit key facts to fit the negotiated outcome265 and increases the
risk that innocent persons plead guilty and are convicted.266
The first way in which states and the federal system can strengthen judi-
cial oversight and transparency of plea bargaining is by encouraging or
requiring judges to review the terms of the plea agreement at the plea hear-
ing.  Rules should further mandate that judges conduct a careful dialogue
with the defendant to ensure that the guilty plea is voluntary, knowing, and
factually based.  In some states, rules or practice already encourage judges to
inquire into the terms of any agreement associated with a guilty plea.267
261 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
262 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3); 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 39, § 21.4(f) (discuss-
ing the factual basis requirement in state and federal jurisdictions).
263 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (requiring that a record of the
inquiry into the validity of the guilty plea be made); supra notes 72–79 and accompanying
text (discussing the requirement that plea hearings be open to the public).
264 Appleman, supra note 42, at 751; see 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 39, § 21.4(f) nn.
210–21 (listing cases permitting the court to find factual basis based on stipulations of the
parties or written records); Barkow, supra note 34, at 1026 (describing the typical inquiry
into plea validity as “cursory”); Allison D. Redlich, The Validity of Pleading Guilty, in 2
ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 1, 13–14, 20–21 (Brian H. Bornstein & Monica K. Miller
eds., 2016) (discussing studies showing that plea hearings last on average less than ten
minutes and that most tender-of-plea forms omit mention of factual guilt).
265 See supra Section IV.D; Redlich, supra note 264, at 20–21 (discussing studies showing
that judges frequently fail to inquire into factual basis of guilty plea); Turner, supra note
21, at 212–13.
266 See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Unnerving the Judges: Judicial Responsibility for the Rampart
Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 787, 791–92 (2001) (“It has now become common practice for
judges in California courts to rely on prosecutors to inquire about or set forth the factual
basis for guilty pleas.  Judges rarely engage in probing questioning to determine whether a
defendant is pleading guilty because he is actually guilty, or whether the defendant is
pleading guilty because he feels there is no way to contest trumped-up charges and fears
imposition of the maximum sentence if he proceeds to trial.” (footnote omitted)).
267 See 9 CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN & MICHAEL TOBIN, WISCONSIN CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 23:21 (2d ed. Westlaw 2020) (“[T]he court must ascertain the terms of the
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Going over the terms of the plea agreement with the defendant can help the
court determine whether any of the concessions exchanged might have
coerced the defendant to waive his right to trial.268  When reviewing the
agreement’s terms, the court is also better positioned to examine whether
the defendant understands the consequences of pleading guilty, whether the
guilty plea is factually based, and whether defense counsel has adequately
advised the defendant about the plea agreement.269
In some jurisdictions, judges have been reluctant to conduct this type of
review of the plea agreement because of concerns that their involvement
would be considered improper and might violate rules prohibiting participa-
tion in plea negotiations.270  In fact, caselaw suggests that neither reviewing
the agreement’s terms nor conducting a thorough plea inquiry to ensure that
the plea is voluntary, knowing, and factually based amounts to improper judi-
cial participation.271  But to make this clear, legislatures should amend crimi-
nal procedure rules to encourage or require a more probing inquiry into the
guilty plea and the plea agreement at the public plea hearing.
States should also expressly mandate that the court examine the factual
basis of a guilty plea at the hearing—a requirement that the federal and
most, but not all, state systems already impose.272  Criminal procedure rules
should further specify what type of inquiry or standard of proof is required to
show that a plea is factually based.  Consider, for example, the more robust
plea review that occurs in our military criminal justice system.  Military judges
may not rely merely on stipulations of facts between the parties to establish a
factual basis.273  Instead, they must engage the accused in a “dialogue in
which the military judge poses questions about the nature of the offense and
the accused provides answers that describe his personal understanding of the
agreement. . . .  [T]he court should then address the defendant personally to ascertain
whether any other promises were used to obtain the plea.”); VT. R. CRIM. P. 11 reporter’s
notes to 1977 amendment.
268 See, e.g., State v. Farrell, 606 N.W.2d 524, 530 (N.D. 2000).
269 See id.; 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 39, § 21.4(f) n. 209 (discussing cases showing
that colloquy with the defendant is the preferred method of establishing factual basis).
270 See supra notes 209–14 and accompanying text.
271 See, e.g., United States v. Andrade-Larrios, 39 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1994) (“In this
case, the judge was not doing anything to pressure or persuade Andrade–Larrios to take
the deal.  The deal had been made, and the judge was trying to find out what it was.”);
United States v. Cone, 323 F. App’x 865, 870–71 (11th Cir. 2009); People v. Cobbs, 505
N.W.2d 208, 212–13 (Mich. 1993); State v. Bangert, 389 N.W.2d 12, 29–31 (Wis. 1986);
Aguirre-Mata v. State, 125 S.W.3d 473, 474–77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
272 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 39, § 21.4(f).
273 United States v. Schrader, 60 M.J. 830, 831 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2005) (“The
inquiry went no further than the stipulation of fact, which, in this case as well as most
others we see, offered little more than a bare-bones recitation of the elements.  All military
judges should remind themselves that such stipulations, without a more detailed inquiry,
are not an adequate factual basis supporting guilt.  Furthermore, conclusory statements
alone acknowledging guilt, without the facts establishing that guilt, will generally result in a
deficient record.”).
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criminality of his or her conduct.”274  The dialogue is supposed to entail a
genuine effort to elicit the true facts, and judges are not supposed to ask
leading questions that produce simple “yes” and “no” responses.275  Judges
may also reject the guilty plea if the evidence presented at the hearing is
inconsistent.276
In addition to the military justice system, some states have rules that
expressly require judges to engage in a dialogue with the defendant as a
means of establishing factual basis.  In New Jersey, for example, the court
may not accept a guilty plea “without first questioning the defendant person-
ally . . . , and determining by inquiry of the defendant and others, in the
court’s discretion, that there is a factual basis for the plea and that the plea is
made voluntarily [and knowingly].”277  Other state and federal rules should
similarly make clear that written stipulations of facts are not sufficient to sup-
port a guilty plea and that judges must independently determine—preferably
by questioning the defendant or witnesses—the plea’s factual basis.  Caselaw
should also discourage judges from asking leading questions at the plea col-
loquy, as the military justice system does.278
While the more careful colloquy would demand some additional time
and effort, its costs would not be significant.  Judges already must go through
a list of explanations with the defendant during the colloquy, and it would
take no more than several additional minutes to conduct the additional
inquiries.279
274 United States v. Hartman, 69 M.J. 467, 469 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
275 United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 143 (C.A.A.F. 2004), aff’d, 64 M.J. 439
(C.A.A.F. 2007).
276 United States v. Pinero, 60 M.J. 31, 34 (C.A.A.F. 2004); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MAR-
TIAL UNITED STATES app. at A8-7 (2012) (“The military judge should be alert to discrepan-
cies in the accused’s description or between the accused’s description and any stipulation.
If the accused’s discussion or other information discloses a possible defense, the military
judge must inquire into the matter, and may not accept the plea if a possible defense
exists.”).
277 N.J. CT. R. 3:9-2; see also In re Manosh, 108 A.3d 212, 216–18 (Vt. 2014) (“A court
cannot short-circuit the express requirement of personally addressing a defendant con-
cerning these matters by relying on a written form signed by the defendant.”); People v.
Chung, No, CRA02-002, 2004 WL 186292, at *3–4 (Guam Jan. 26, 2004) (affirming that the
court must “personally inquire whether the defendant understood the nature of the
charge” in relation to the facts, and a recitation of the indictment to the defendant fails to
meet this requirement); State v. Bangert, 389 N.W.2d 12, 24 (Wis. 1986) (“[I]t is no longer
sufficient for a trial judge merely to perfunctorily question the defendant about his under-
standing of the charge.  Likewise, a perfunctory affirmative response by the defendant . . .
without an affirmative showing that the nature of the crime has been communicated to
him . . . will not satisfy the requirement . . . .”); State v. Feng, 421 A.2d 1258, 1266–67 (R.I.
1980) (holding that the trial court must personally “engage in as extensive an interchange
as necessary” so that the record “affirmatively disclose[s]” the defendant’s understanding
of the factual nature of the charges).
278 For a similar proposal, see Julian A. Cook, III, Federal Guilty Pleas: Inequities, Indi-
gence, and the Rule 11 Process, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1073, 1120–21 (2019).
279 Schneider & Alkon, supra note 4, at 457 (proposing that during the colloquy, judges
ask questions such as “How was the plea offer conveyed?” and “Was there any limit on the
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A more probing judicial inquiry into the facts of the case and into the
details of the plea agreement would better fulfill judges’ responsibility to
evaluate the constitutional validity of the guilty plea.280  By improving over-
sight of plea bargaining, it would also encourage the parties to conduct nego-
tiations more responsibly and would enhance the fairness of the plea
bargain.  Because plea colloquies are open to the public, a more thorough
judicial inquiry into the plea bargain’s terms at the colloquy would also per-
mit members of the community and other interested parties to learn how
plea bargaining works.281
In states that permit judges to participate in the negotiations, judges
already tend to review the facts in the case and the reasonableness of the
bargain more carefully because they become involved earlier in the process,
before the parties have settled on a disposition.282  As I have argued in
greater depth in previous work, with the proper precautions to avoid coercive
influences, judges who participate directly in the negotiations can make
important contributions to the fairness and accuracy of plea bargains.283  As
a more neutral participant, the judge can ensure that the interests of all
affected parties—defendants, victims, and the public—are fairly considered.
Judicial participation also enhances transparency and accountability in the
process.284
Yet in many states, judicial involvement still can—and often does—occur
off the record.  It would be preferable for states that permit judicial participa-
tion in the negotiations to require that such participation occur on the
record, as a few states already do.285  A recording requirement would
increase the transparency and therefore the fairness and legitimacy of the
plea offer?” and that adding these questions to the colloquy would “take less than a min-
ute”); Redlich, supra note 264, at 13–14 (discussing studies finding that, on average, plea
colloquies last less than ten minutes).
280 See State v. Farrell, 606 N.W.2d 524, 530 (N.D. 2000).
281 See Simonson, supra note 9, at 2178 (noting the value of opening plea hearings to
the public).
282 See Turner, supra note 21, at 259–60.
283 Id. at 256–66.
284 Id. at 261–62.
285 See, e.g., MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2) (“The judge may participate in plea discussions
at the request of one or both of the parties if the discussions are recorded and made part
of the record.”); VT. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1) (“The court shall not participate in any such
[plea] discussions, unless the proceedings are taken down by a court reporter or recording
equipment.”); see also Cripps v. State, 137 P.3d 1187, 1191 (Nev. 2006) (“First, because of
the inherent risks involved, as well as the difficulties in reviewing claims on appeal of
improper judicial coercion, we conclude that henceforth all off-the-record discussions
between the parties and the judge respecting the plea negotiations shall be expressly pro-
hibited.  When the district court participates to any degree in the plea process, the judge
shall ensure that such participation is placed on the record and transcribed.”); State v.
Warner, 762 So. 2d 507, 514 (Fla. 2000) (“A record must be made of all plea discussions
involving the court.”).  For an argument in favor of such recording, see Albert W.
Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1148
(1976); Donnelly, supra note 4, at 429–31.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 49 21-JAN-21 9:50
2021] transparency  in  plea  bargaining 1021
process.  As the official comments to the Massachusetts rule on recording
explain, transparency helps address concerns that “judicial participation in
plea negotiations can be coercive and leave the impression of unfairness.”286
When judicial remarks on plea agreements occur on the record, this allows
the public and the appellate courts to monitor the remarks for statements
that might pressure defendants to enter a guilty plea.287  Transparency of
these discussions can also help hold the participants in plea discussions more
accountable and better ensure that similarly situated defendants are treated
equally.288  Finally, recording of the discussions with the judge can also help
“[dissipate] the under-the-table aura surrounding [plea] agreements, and
consequent public distrust of them.”289
While some may be concerned that recording would be too burden-
some, the experiences of Massachusetts and Vermont suggest that it is
neither too costly nor impractical.290  Indeed, in some jurisdictions, judges
have acted on their own initiative to ensure that their participation in negoti-
ations is recorded.291  Interviews of judges across ten states where judicial
participation is permitted and regularly practiced reveal that discussions “in
many of these states [are] now on the record, whether it be in a courtroom,
at the bench, or recorded in chambers” and that this “appears to be a judicial
preference, not a set practice,” in large part because on-the-record bench
conferences are seen by many judges to be more efficient.292
Another concern with placing judicial involvement on the record is that
it would disclose to the public cooperation and other sensitive matters that
need to be kept confidential.  Judges already have the tools to address this
concern.  In states with on-the-record plea conferences, they can limit public
access through sidebar conferences to consider confidential matters, and
they can seal the record after the fact as necessary.293
Should plea discussions fall apart, courts also have a range of tools to
prevent potential prejudice to the fairness of a subsequent trial.  Rules of
286 MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2) reporter’s notes.
287 VT. R. CRIM. P. 11 reporter’s notes to 1977 amend.
288 See Donnelly, supra note 4, at 429, 431.
289 VT. R. CRIM. P. 11 reporter’s notes to 1977 amend.
290 See Bos. Globe Media Partners, LLC v. Chief Just. of Trial Ct., 130 N.E.3d 742, 765
(Mass. 2019) (“We heard comparable concerns about requiring ‘lobby conferences’ with
judges regarding a possible plea agreement to be conducted on the record.  Those fears
have not been realized in the four years since this requirement was added to our rules of
criminal procedure.”).  Vermont has had its recording rules since 1977 and has not
amended them.
291 See, e.g., State v. Poole, 583 A.2d 265, 273 (Md. Ct. App. 1991) (“While, as we have
stated, the Rule does not require that these discussions be recorded, we encourage trial
judges to make a record of pertinent discussion and decisions reached.”); Donnelly, supra
note 4, at 429.
292 Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Manage-
rial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 341 (2016).
293 See, e.g., HELLE SACHSE & TIM MAGUIRE, MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE (2019); supra notes 182–84 and accompanying text.
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evidence already prohibit the parties from introducing at trial evidence of
the negotiations or any statements made during the negotiations.294  In high-
profile trials, the parties and judges can also address the potential taint of the
jury pool through careful jury selection, and if necessary, through a change
of venue.295  In some cases, however, the risk to the fairness of the trial may
be so high as to permit closure of the plea hearings to the public.296  Any
such closure must be narrowly tailored.297  And even when closure of a plea
hearing is warranted, the judge’s involvement in the plea discussions can still
help ensure that the interests of all affected parties are fairly considered.
Another critique of the requirement that plea discussions with the judge
be recorded is that such a rule would discourage candor in the negotia-
tions.298  While in some cases, recording may have this effect, experience
with the rule suggests that it does not unduly inhibit negotiations.299  The
rule also does not preclude informal discussions between the parties to occur
ahead of the judge’s involvement.  Importantly, the value that recording
brings—increasing fairness and public confidence in plea bargaining—out-
weighs the relatively minor cost of reduced candor in plea negotiations
involving the judge.  Accordingly, states that permit judicial participation in
the negotiations should follow the lead of Florida, Massachusetts, and Ver-
mont, and require that any negotiations involving the court be recorded.
CONCLUSION
Plea bargaining has become the dominant method of resolving criminal
cases in the United States, yet it remains opaque and insulated from public
scrutiny.  To better understand and address the persistent problems in the
plea process, we must bring plea bargaining out of the shadows.  As the
Supreme Court has recognized in interpreting the constitutional right of
public access, transparency is critical to ensuring the fairness, accuracy, and
legitimacy of the criminal process.
Courts and legislatures can adopt a range of measures to improve the
transparency of plea bargaining.  They can mandate that plea agreements be
in writing and filed with the court and that rejected plea offers be placed on
record before a case proceeds to trial.  Making use of widely available tech-
nology, states and the federal system can also create searchable plea
databases accessible to prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges.  Finally,
criminal procedure rules can encourage a thorough, independent, and on-
the-record judicial inquiry into the validity of guilty pleas and the terms of
294 See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
295 Cf. Robert Hardaway & Douglas B. Tumminello, Pretrial Publicity in Criminal Cases of
National Notoriety: Constructing a Remedy for the Remediless Wrong, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 39, 42–43
(1996) (noting the limits of these remedies in cases of “national notoriety”).
296 See id. at 82.
297 Id. at 84–85 (discussing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for the Cnty. of Norfolk,
457 U.S. 596, 598, 607 (1982)).
298 King & Wright, supra note 292, at 342; Turner, supra note 21, at 242.
299 See Donnelly, supra note 4, at 429–31.
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plea agreements.  These reforms would improve the fairness and accuracy of
plea bargaining, would be consistent with our constitutional commitment to
open criminal proceedings, and would be realistic and manageable.
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